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Abstract
This thesis investigates three questions on fiscal policy that have gained importance in the
recent turbulent times of general economic decline, labelled as the Great Recession.
The first chapter examines how government spending multipliers can vary depending on
the location of the debt holder. Empirically, we find that fiscal multipliers are larger when
government purchases are financed by issuing debt to non-resident foreign investors, than
to resident home investors. Using a theoretical model we then show how the location of
the government debt holder produces these di↵erential responses through the extent that
investment is crowded out in each case. Increasing international capital mobility of the
resident private sector can attenuate the di↵erence between the two types of financing.
The second chapter contributes to the current debate on fiscal sustainability and fiscal co-
ordination in currency unions. It does so using a large-scale New-Keynesian DSGE model
calibrated to the EA South and EA North, and fed with a particular fiscal policy scenario
identified using the guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact. The results suggest that
when monetary policy is constrained by the zero-lower bound an expansion in the EA North
o↵sets a consolidation in the EA South leading to a union-wide increase in output.
The third chapter studies the e↵ects of fiscal policy in a setting where crisis shocks propagate
through the real exchange rate to generate distortions in labour and financial markets. The
joint presence of labour market and financial frictions, modelled as downward nominal rigid
wages and a collateral constraint on private borrowing, endogenously generate unemployment
and persistently high debt levels. Fiscal policies aiming to stimulate or consolidate the
economy a↵ect the movement of the real exchange rate in such a way so as to generate it
toothless in the face of a ’debt-unemployment’ trade-o↵.
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Preface
This thesis investigates three questions on fiscal policy that have gained importance in
the recent turbulent times of general economic decline, labelled as the Great Recession.
The first chapter (co-authored with S. Zimic) and entitled ’Sources of Borrowing and
Fiscal Multipliers’ examines how government spending multipliers can vary depending
on the location of the debt holder. In a sample of 59 countries we find that government
spending multipliers are larger when government purchases are financed by issuing debt
to foreign investors (non-residents), compared to the case when government purchases
are financed by issuing debt to home investors (residents). In a theoretical model
we show that the location of the government debt holder produces these di↵erential
responses through the extent that investment is crowded out in each case. Increasing
international capital mobility of the resident private sector decreases the di↵erence
between two types of financing, a prediction, which is also confirmed by the data. The
share of rule-of-thumb workers, as well as the strength of the public good in the utility
function also play key roles in quantitatively explaining the results obtained in the
data.
The second chapter entitled ’Fiscal Policy Coordination under the Zero Lower Bound’
investigates the e↵ects of coordinating fiscal policy in a currency union. It constructs
a large-scale New-Keynesian DSGE model with nominal frictions in prices and wages,
9
a distinction of households into liquidity-constrained and Ricardian, and an expanded
fiscal sector with a role for productive government investment. The model is then
calibrated to the EU South and EU North and fed with a particular fiscal policy
scenario identified using the guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact, which assigns
a fiscal expansion to the EU North and a fiscal consolidation to the EU South. The
results suggest that when monetary policy is constrained by the zero-lower bound the
expansion in the EA North o↵sets the consolidation in the EA South leading to a
union-wide increase in output. Under active monetary policy the regional spillovers
are dampened and the expansion in the EA North triggers an increase in the real
interest rate leading to an appreciation of the Euro. The paper provides a theoretical
contribution to understand the current debate on fiscal sustainability and coordination
in currency unions.
The third chapter entitled ’Fiscal Policy under Labor Market and Financial Frictions’
investigates the e↵ects of fiscal policy in a setting, which captures the relevant features
to hindering the process of recovery from a financial crisis in a currency union: high
unemployment and a slow private sector deleveraging process. Crisis conditions arise
due to a joint presence of labor market and financial frictions modeled as downward
nominal rigid wages and a collateral constraint on private sector borrowing. The two
frictions interact through the real exchange rate to spill over crisis shocks from the
financial sector of the model into the labor market. Fiscal policies aiming to stimulate
or consolidate the economy a↵ect the movement of the real exchange rate in such a way
so as to generate it toothless in the face of a ’debt-unemployment’ trade-o↵. Welfare
multipliers are largest for a negative shock to government investment.
The thesis is structured as follows. In order to facilitate reading, figures have not been
included in the main text but have been introduced in an appendix at the end of each
chapter. All reference material is to be found at the end of the document.
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Chapter 1
Sources of Borrowing and Fiscal
Multipliers
with Srecko Zimic (European University Institute)
1.1 Introduction
Several European economies are currently undertaking significant measures to reduce
government spending with the view of lightening their debt burdens and achieving
healthy signs in their growth paths. During this ongoing process, a number of the
leading actors in the European crisis have prescribed policies, which have triggered
a heated economic debate with regards to countries’ prospects for economic recovery.
The particular focus of attention since the first quarter of 2013 has been the size of fiscal
multipliers. This debate was revitalized at the same time where statistics of progress
were published for countries like Greece, Italy and Spain, which had failed to show
positive signs in their economic activity. The key actor responsible for prescribing fiscal
policy in several of these European countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
11
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itself, had also revived its attention on fiscal multipliers with Blanchard and Leigh
(2013, pp.3) questioning “whether forecasters have underestimated fiscal multipliers[?]”
The question we attempt to answer in this paper is whether the transmission mechanism
of a fiscal shock can di↵er depending on whether government spending is financed via
government debt issued to home investors (residents), or government debt issued to
foreign investors (non-residents). Economic theory, but also our empirical investigation,
suggests that government spending shocks have di↵erential e↵ects on the real economy
depending on the location that government debt is held. As such, the magnitude of
fiscal multipliers is dependent on the source of borrowing for the government and in
particular are larger when government spending is financed via debt issued abroad
rather than at home.
We approach the question in a twofold way. First, we study the responses of endogenous
variables such as output, consumption and investment to debt-financed government
spending shocks in a structural vector-autoregression (SVAR), whereby we propose a
novel way to identify the di↵erent types of shocks in the data. This novel conceptual
framework of identification is necessary primarily because of the reduced availability
of data on both domestic and foreign public debt for a large number of economies.
Empirically, we are able to distinguish between the two shocks by extending the con-
ventional sign restrictions approach of Canova and de Nicolo (2003) and Canova and
Pappa (2005) to include magnitude restrictions in the spirit of Kilian and Murphy
(2012). Sign restrictions work by limiting the responses of endogenous variables to
the shocks in a way that is theoretically robust to a large class of economic models,
which do not necessarily share the same microfoundations. In addition, they also avoid
problems that may arise with endogeneity and the predictability of movements in the
endogenous variables of the model. Magnitude restrictions complement this approach
by combining restrictions on the signs of endogenous variables with further empirically
12
1.1. INTRODUCTION
accepted bounds on their magnitude.1We derive the magnitude restrictions by impos-
ing relatively minor assumptions on the movements of the unobserved components of
total public debt and total public external debt and find that fiscal multipliers are
larger when government spending is financed with debt held abroad. We confirm our
proposed identification methodology by estimating the same SVAR on US data, for
which the disaggregated debt components of interest are available.
Armed with this empirical evidence, we then propose a theoretical model, which al-
lows us to think of a setting in which such e↵ects are present. The fundamentals
of the mechanism arise due to the specification of the economy’s resource constraint,
that is how credit-constrained the private sector is in borrowing from abroad. The
composition of the resource constraint influences the extent of crowding out of pri-
vate investment, which is the main feature driving the di↵erential responses on fiscal
multipliers depending on the location of borrowing. In addition, we also show how a
standard wealth e↵ect that is active in most Keynesian models also a↵ects fiscal mul-
tipliers di↵erentially. By allowing the private sector in the economy to accommodate
government increases in foreign debt, which is implemented by altering the levels of the
household’s credit-constraint through the debt-elasticity of the interest rate, we show
how these di↵erential responses on output can be dampened. We conclude that these
factors are important to understand why fiscal multipliers are di↵erent for the two cases
of government financing. In addition, we augment the model with utility-enhancing
government expenditure and show that under plausible parametrizations we are able
to quantitatively replicate the fiscal multipliers identified in the data.
Our work ties in with several branches of the fiscal policy literature, in particular those
emphasizing the response of private investment following a fiscal shock. On the em-
1For example, Kilian and Murphy (2012) implement these on the short-run oil supply elasticity
and on the impact response of real activity. In this way, they are able to reduce the set of admissible
model solutions to a small number of qualitatively similar estimates.
13
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pirical side, work relying on the SVAR methodology includes studies by Blanchard
and Perotti (1999); Fatas and Mihov (2001); Perotti (2005) among others, which iden-
tify fiscal shocks by assuming that fiscal variables do not contemporaneously react to
changes in economic conditions. Using this specification the conclusions generally sug-
gest that private consumption, output, employment and the real wage increase with
the fiscal shock, features which are all consistent with the results obtained in this pa-
per. Using quarterly data for Canada, Japan, UK and the US, Pappa (2009) finds that
increases in government spending increases private consumption contemporaneously
and employment with some lag, but responses of investment are mixed. More evidence
on the responses to investment in the US is provided by Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
and Leeper et al. (2010), who find that investment falls in response to a a government
spending increase.
However, most of these studies do not allow for a flexible specification of how the
government spending shock is financed. At best, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) analyze
three policy scenarios: deficit-spending, deficit-financed tax cuts and a balanced budget
spending expansion. Bermperoglou et al. (2013) in turn look at how di↵erent govern-
ment outlays a↵ect output and unemployment, by studying the e↵ects of shocks to
government consumption, government investment and government employment. Nev-
ertheless, there is no existing study, which di↵erentiates between debt-financed gov-
ernment spending shocks where the location of debt holding is assessed. This gap in
the literature presumably arises because of the di culty in obtaining detailed data on
debt components. Data on public debt from the World Bank for example only reports
’central government debt’2 and ’external debt stocks’.3 In this paper, we fill precisely
this gap. By proposing an identification strategy, which relies on movements of the
2Indicator code: GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS
3Indicator code: DT.DOD.DECT.GN.ZS
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components of government debt, and by imposing relatively insignificant assumptions
on them, we are able to isolate the e↵ects of fiscal shocks that are financed via debt
held at home or debt held abroad. We also show how our methodology is validated
by estimating the same system on US data where the disaggregated data of interest is
available.
On the theoretical side, there is little work analyzing the heterogeneous e↵ects of fiscal
shocks on the real economy, where the location of debt-financed government spending
matters. Although the transmission mechanism arises naturally, as will be seen in
Section 3.2 most work has paid little attention to this distinction. The closest study to
ours is recent work by Shen and Yang (2013). They analyze the e↵ects of government
spending in an environment specific to developing countries with limited international
capital mobility, noting an exchange rate channel, which can mitigate the responses of
output following a government spending shock. As such, to the best of our knowledge,
this paper forms the first attempt at studying the heterogeneous e↵ects of di↵erent
types of debt-financed government spending shocks on the economy.
Our work can also be seen as providing an empirical validation, and complementary
theoretical interpretation to Broner et al. (2014), which study the incentives of creditor
discrimination in times of sovereign risk. In that paper, during periods where the
probability of default on sovereign debt is large, creditor discrimination arises because
sovereign debt o↵ers a larger expected return to domestic creditors rather than foreign
creditors (following from the assumption that domestic debt is less likely to be defaulted
on). Given financial frictions in private borrowing, which prevent the private sector to
finance their domestic debt from abroad, domestic purchases of sovereign debt lead to
a crowding out of productive investment. In our paper, we interpret debt purchases by
domestic and foreign creditors as financing government spending, thereby allowing us
to study the e↵ects of domestically- and foreign-debt financed fiscal policy shocks.
15
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Finally, our work is also related to Werning and Farhi (2012), who allude to the het-
erogeneous e↵ects caused by domestic and foreign government borrowing. They show
that when changes in government spending are financed with transfers from abroad the
associated fiscal multipliers may be substantially larger than one. The reason for this
is that a closed economy under autarky is considered to be operating as an incomplete
market, whereby no insurance to income shocks can be made. As a result, residents
have to adjust their consumption and investment to bu↵er any changes in a government
spending shock. However, in an open economy, it is nonresident foreigners that finance
the government spending through transfers.
On the policy front our analysis has implications for the e↵ects of fiscal consolidations
in several countries. In particular, the e↵ect of a fiscal consolidation, or more generally
any change in a government’s fiscal instruments, will be influenced by the composition
of its debt, that is whether it is held abroad or domestically. Since Foreign debt-
financed government shocks have higher multipliers this implies that in countries such
as Greece, where most of the debt is externally held, government expenditure cuts
will bring deeper than intended recessions; or rather deeper recessions than where
the reduction in government expenditures were to be accompanied by a purchase of
domestically held debt. Interestingly enough, the composition of public debt alone
plays a role in determining the business cycle absent any changes in fiscal policy. Since
the fiscal multiplier on output is greater for a Foreign debt-financed than a Home
debt-financed government spending shock, shifting the mixture of the government’s
debt portfolio from home to abroad (but keeping the total level constant) can trigger a
recession. Conversely, a change in the composition from where the majority of public
debt is held abroad to being held at home can trigger an expansion, ceteris paribus.
As can be seen in Figure (1.1.1) this issue is mostly relevant for the Eurozone’s debt-
distressed economies where the composition of public debt shifted from largely being
16
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held domestically to being held externally since the 2000s. The reliance on external
debt rather than domestic debt after the onset of the financial crisis could thus lead to
a fiscal multiplier that turns negative without any changes in government expenditures.
Figure 1.1.1: The Composition of Public Debt in the Eurozone Periphery
2000Q1 2001Q2 2002Q4 2004Q1 2005Q3 2006Q4 2008Q2 2009Q3 2010Q4 2012Q2
40
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80
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Such a conclusion may have important consequences for the fiscal consolidation pack-
ages proposed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF for distressed
economies during the ongoing European debt crisis. It may also have important conse-
quences on the prospects of economic recovery as avoiding to consider the location of
financing of government consumption may erroneously lead to poorly-prescribed poli-
cies that actually deepen the recession in these economies when asked to cut back on
their government expenditures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2 we describe the
empirical strategy used to estimate the SVAR and present the results of the estimation.
In Section 3.2 we build a theoretical model and in Section 3.3 we use it to illustrate
17
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the mechanism and the results of our quantitative analysis. In Section 1.5 we report
fiscal multipliers and perform a sensitivity analysis on the model’s key features. In
Section 1.6 we focus on the issue of imperfect capital mobility for the private sector
and investigate the important country characteristics that drive the model’s results.
Finally, in Section 3.4 we conclude.
1.2 Empirical Investigation
We study the e↵ects of a government spending shock financed via public debt and
propose a strategy for identifying fiscal shocks financed with debt held by residents
within the domestic economy (Home-financed government spending shock), or held
by nonresidents abroad (Foreign-financed government spending shock). Our empirical
procedure consists of estimating an SVAR for 59 countries, for which data availability
on the location of debt holdings is not readily available. We proceed by proposing a
conceptual framework derived from theoretical foundations, which allows us to identify
the two types of government spending shocks based on two conventional assumptions.
1.2.1 Theoretical Background on SVARs
A Structural Vector Autoregression model (SVAR) can be written as:
A0yn,t = ↵i + A1yn,t 1 + A2yn,t 1 + ...+ ANyn,t N +B"n,t (1.2.1)
where yn,t is a k⇥ 1 vector of endogenous variables, ↵i are fixed e↵ects, and where the
structural errors are assumed to be white noise N (0, I k). It is assumed that the true
model can be represented via a finite lag VAR with lag p 2 [1, 2, ..., N ]. The model in
18
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(1.2.1) then implies the following structural moving average representation:
yn,t = B(L)"n,t
where B(L) is the impulse response function. However, the system in (1.2.1) cannot
be directly estimated, so we need to transform it into a reduced form representaion:
yn,t = a
⇤
i + A
⇤
1yn,t 1 + A
⇤
2yn,t 1 + ...+ A
⇤
Nyn,t N +  n,t (1.2.2)
where  n,t = A
 1
0 B"n,t and A
⇤
p = A
 1
0 Ap for p 2 [1, 2, ..., N ]. We then choose to esti-
mate the reduced form model (1.2.2) using a first di↵erence estimator which eliminates
possible fixed e↵ects and transforms the data into stationary series. 4
In addition, (1.2.1) also implies the following structural moving average representation:
yn,t = C(L) n,t (1.2.3)
where C(L) is the non-structural impulse response function and is related to the
structural impulse responses as C(L) = A 10 B(L). By defining S = A
 1
0 B and given
the assumed distribution of errors
P
" = I, then the impact matrix must satisfy:
X
 
= SS 0 (1.2.4)
where
P
  is the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form errors. However,
the structural decomposition in (1.2.4) is not unique and the way this decomposition is
4As explained in Anderson and Hsiao (1982) the first di↵erence estimator is not consistent for T
fixed and they instead propose to instrument lagged dependent variables by their second lags,  yt 2.
We experimented with an IV estimation, but the results were imprecise due to weak instruments. We
therefore opted for OLS estimation, as IV point estimates also contained explosive roots. We have
also estimated the model assuming fixed e↵ects in the di↵erenced model - the results do not change
quantitatively in this case.
19
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chosen will a↵ect the identification of the impact matrix in the model. For example, for
some arbitrary orthogonalization, S˜ (e.g. a Choleski decomposition), the alternative
structural decomposition can be obtained by randomly choosing a matrix H with
HH 0 = I and post-multiplying H by S˜. It is then immediate that S˜H(S˜H)0 = S˜S˜ 0
and therefore the condition in (1.2.4) is satisfied. Therefore, the entire set of permissible
impact matrices is infinite and the impact matrix cannot be identified from the data.
1.2.2 Identification of Shocks
To obtain a unique structural decomposition, the econometrician needs to assume
k(k   1)/2 restrictions. In the present paper, rather than imposing restrictions to
obtain a unique identification we obtain the distribution of impulse response functions
by retaining only those that satisfy prior constraints. These constraints are derived
from economic theory predicted by the model we propose in Section (3.2) and also
replicate the results of a number of studies studying the e↵ects of fiscal shocks (see e.g.
Pappa (2009); Mountford and Uhlig (2009)). These conditions rely on restricting the
sign as well as the magnitude of the responses of endogenous variable to the shocks
being identified.
Decomposition of Debt Variables
Since our main question of interest is whether the source of financing of government
debt is able to di↵erentially a↵ect the endogenous variables in our model (e.g. con-
sumption, output and investment), as a first step we illustrate the problematic nature
of the data at our disposal.
The debt data available is obtained from Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011), which report
’total gross central government debt ’ and ’total gross external debt’. But, we do not
20
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have their disaggregated components ’total home public debt’ and ’total external public
debt ’, which would be of direct relevance for our empirical investigation. For example,
looking at equation (1.2.5), if data on ’total home public debt’ were available then it
would be straightforward to identify the two types of shocks of interest, that is a Home-
debt financed government spending shock and a Foreign-debt financed government
spending shock.
Total public debt
Total external debt
=
Public home debt + Public external debt
Public external debt + Private external debt
(1.2.5)
However, since we do not have such variables for the whole sample we choose to rely on,
we proceed by proposing two assumptions that will enable us to identify the location
of debt holdings from the data. We then use these assumptions to restrict the signs
and magnitudes of the responses of the endogenous variables. Notably, our identifying
assumptions are later validated by estimating the same SVAR on US data (see Section
(1.2.4) a sample for which these disaggregated components are available.5
Assumptions
Before presenting the assumptions needed, we note that fiscal shocks in this study are
considered to be increases in government spending financed by public debt. That is,
we do not assume the government budget constraint to follow a balanced path in each
period. Notably, the assuptions are valid for debt issued by the government both at
home and abroad.
Assumption (1) states that:
5It is important to clarify here that we abstract from issues such as the location of debt issuance,
the currency denomination of debt, the jurisdiction of issuance, the maturity of the assets, and other
features such as which is the issuing government agency. What we are solely interested in exploring
is whether debt-financed government policy produces di↵erential results on other macroeconomic
aggregates depending on whether the holder of debt resides within or outside the economy.
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1. A government spending shock increases external debt via an increase in the cur-
rent account deficit
We label Assumption (1) as the indirect e↵ect of government spending. The indirect
e↵ect states that any increase in government spending due to debt issuance, be it held
domestically or abroad, will lead to an increase in external debt via a deterioration
in the current account. This will be This e↵ect is validated in numerous studies that
investigate the e↵ects of government spending shocks on the trade balance (see e.g.
Beetsma et al. (2008) for the EU, or Monacelli and Perotti (2006) for the US, UK,
Canada and Australia) and is also a mechanism present in the model proposed in
Section (3.2).6 Assumption (1) implies that the majority of the proceeds from the
issuance of debt by the government will be allocated to improve the import position of
the domestic economy. At the same time, this e↵ect is also present via an analogous
mechanism that is active on the side of the private sector. If the private sector is not
fully credit-constrained then private borrowing abroad will also increase the external
debt of the economy. The extent of this increase will depend on how perfect access is to
financial markets from the side of the private sector. This consideration is important in
analyzing the di↵erential e↵ects of fiscal shocks on fiscal multipliers and the response
of private investment, as will be explained in Section (3.2).
Assumption (2) states that:
2. The increase in external debt (due to the indirect e↵ect) is smaller than the in-
crease in public debt
Our consideration of the fiscal shock as debt-financed implies that total public debt
increases following a government spending increase, while Assumption (1) guarantees
6Kim and Roubini (2008)and Corsetti and Muller (2006) find that a shock to the budget deficit-
to-GDP ratio in the US leads to an improvement in the current account-to-GDP ratio. We conjecture
that these contrasting results stem from the alternate specification and identification methods used
in these studies.
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that there is also an increase in external debt. Without any further restrictions on the
magnitude of these increases it is impossible to achieve identification on whether the
debt-financed government spending shock is Home-financed or Foreign-financed. To
distinguish between the two, we therefore need to introduce Assumption (2).
Assumption (2) implies that although a deterioration in the current account occurs,
this does not fully compensate for the increase in public debt. Since a deterioration in
the current account implies an increasing surplus in the capital account, the increased
consumption of imports should not be equal to the increase in public debt. It is
straightforward to expect that a current account deterioration occurs, but that some
of the raised public debt will also be used to boost the domestic export sector, thus
limiting the increase in capital outflows.
Magnitude Restrictions
The Assumptions above propose movements on the responses of the debt components
following any type of government financed debt shock. The next step is to translate
these assumptions in the analogous magnitude restrictions that will enable us to dif-
ferentiate between the two types of shocks of interest, that is a Home-debt financed
government spending shock and a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock.
Restriction 1: Home-debt financed government spending shock
By the consideration of the fiscal shock as debt-financed the increase in government
spending increases total public debt, and by Assumption (1) it also increases total
external debt. By Assumption (2) the increase in total external debt is lower than
the increase in total public debt, leading to the restriction that the increase in total
public debt must be greater than the increase in total external debt. This is shown in
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equation (1.2.6).
 n,t+h (public debt) >=  n,t+h (external debt) (1.2.6)
where  n,t+h (public debt) and  n,t+h (external debt) are the impulse responses of the
corresponding debt components to the identified shock. Restriction 1 thus says that
the increase in public debt is at least as large as the increase in external debt.7
Restriction 2: Foreign-debt financed government spending shock
By the consideration of the fiscal shock as debt-financed the increase in government
spending increases public debt, and by Assumption (1) it also increases external debt.
Assumption (2) implies that the increase in external debt is smaller than the increase
in public debt. However, in contrast to the Home-debt financed government spending
shock there is an additional over-and-above increase in external debt via the direct
e↵ect of external debt. This comes from the increase in external debt itself to finance
government spending and the subsequent current account deterioration. This implies
that the increase in external debt is a one-for-one increase in public debt, and follows
immediately from the definition of the variable, hence the terminology. Therefore, the
increase in external debt due to the direct and indirect e↵ect combined is now larger
than the increase in public debt. Intuitively, the external debt multiplier on government
spending is larger for a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock. As a result,
external debt increases more than public debt, which leads to the second magnitude
7Note that this condition does not hold with a strict inequality as it is still theoretically possible,
but empirically implausible, that the current account deterioration triggered by the Home-financed
government spending shock only occurs through an increase in imports.
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restriction in equation (1.2.7).
 n,t+h (public debt) <  n,t+h (external debt) (1.2.7)
where again  n,t+h (public debt) and  n,t+h (external debt) are the impulse responses
of the corresponding debt components to the identified shock. Restriction 2 states that
the increase in public debt is strictly smaller than the increase in external debt.8
Sign Restrictions
In the baseline specification of the empirical model the vector of endogenous variables
yt contains the variables: government spending, output, household consumption, invest-
ment, total public debt and total external debt, collected at annual frequency from 1980
- 2010. For information on the data and sources see section (1.7) in the Appendix. All
series are transformed in log di↵erences and are set in per capita terms.9 Both types of
debt are also in real terms. We employ 2 lags of the endogenous variables as proposed
by the HQ criterion.
8We also include additional restrictions on the size of the multiplier on public debt and on the
size of the multiplier on external debt. The reason is that a number of models consistent with our
baseline restrictions produced high multipliers on public and external debt, although according to our
definition public debt multipliers they should be equal to one. There may be several reasons why
this may not hold empirically, but two obvious cases are: i) our measure of government expenditures
consists of general government final consumption expenditures, which represents only a share of total
government expenditures. ii) our measures of government expenditures, public debt and external debt
may be contaminated due to large measurement errors. Nevertheless, in order to achieve consistency
within our emprical investigation we restrict the size of the multiplier on public debt to be less than
7.5, and the size of the multiplier on external debt to a Foreign-financed shock to be less than 15 - this
approximately corresponds to the lowest 10-th percentile of accepted models without this additional
constraint. Dropping this restriction does not particularly a↵ect the qualitative results, but only causes
fiscal multipliers to become larger - we show unrestricted impulse responses in subsection (1.2.4).
9Outliers are identified as values di↵ering from the mean of each time series by 6-times the in-
terquartile range of their time series. Identified outliers are then replaced with the corresponding
maximum value - in the case of a positive value, they are replaced by the mean plus 6-times the
interquartile range, and in case of a negative value, they are replaced with the mean minus 6-times
the interquartile range.
25
CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF BORROWING
Building on the magnitude restrictions above we then propose the following identifica-
tion restrictions on the endogenous variables of the model in order to disentangle the
government spending shocks from a business cycle shock. In contrast to the restric-
tions employed in the literature, which are to a large extent conventional, we propose
identification restrictions, which are mostly theory based. The reason is that those em-
ployed in other studies are hard to justify with the low frequency data at our disposal.
For example, assuming that it takes more than a period for government spending to
respond to unexpected output movements is unappealing in annual data because of
the presence of automatic stabilizers.10 Our proposed restrictions are found in Table
(1.1).11
Table 1.1: Identification Restrictions
G Y C I Public Debt External Debt
Home + + + +
Foreign + + + +
Business Cycle + + + -
Combining the sign restrictions in Table (1.1) with the magnitude restrictions (1.2.6)
and (1.2.7) we are then able to separately identify a Home-debt financed government
spending shock, a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock, and a business
cycle shock.
Finally, following the literature on fiscal multipliers we calculate the cumulative mul-
10We impose these restrictions to hold for 3 periods in our baseline estimation, but also experimented
with shorter horizons.
11Matching the empirical results with the theoretical predictions in Section (3.2) would necessitate
additional restrictions on the responses of government consumption and public debt. Namely, we would
need to impose that public debt increases one-for-one with government consumption. Forcing such a
restriction however, results in no accepted draws, as public debt tends to increase disproportionally
more than government consumption when no restrictions are used. The restriction we therefore
impose is to allow public debt to increase less than five times more than government consumption.
This suggests that our estimates of absolute multipliers may be upwardly biased, however the relative
di↵erence between the two types of shocks remains una↵ected.
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tiplier as:
mt+s =
Pt+s
q=t  ln(Xq)Pt+s
q=t  ln(Gs)
✓
X¯
G
◆
where X corresponds to the endogenous variable of interest (output Y , consumption
C and investment I) and G is government consumption.
⇣
X¯
G
⌘
is the steady state
of the endogenous variable over government consumption and serves to translate the
growth rate into absolute values. We use the mean values of variables in our sample
to calculate the steady states.12
1.2.3 Results
We estimate the SVAR using a Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Estimator.13
As can be seen from Figures (1.7.1) and (1.7.2) by distinguishing the government
spending shock as Home debt-financed and Foreign debt-financed we obtain a di↵eren-
tial response on the main variables of interest, investment. For a Home-debt financed
government spending shock the responses is negative whilst for a Foreign-financed gov-
ernment spending shock it is positive. Government spending, private consumption,
public debt and external debt increase by assumption for both shocks and output too
increases in both cases, but at di↵erent magnitudes.
Moreover, from Figures (1.7.3) and (1.7.4) we can see that the magnitude of the output
multiplier is much smaller for a Home-financed government spending shock. The impact
multipliers are approximately 1 for the Home-financed shock and approximately 3 for
12Owyang et al. (2013) show that calculating multipliers in this ex post fashion may lead to upwardly
biased estimates. They instead follow Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011) and convert GDP
and government spending changes to the same units before the estimation. However, their framework
is based on the Jorda decomposition and is thus not possible to use this transformation in a standard
VAR specification, since here all variables must be of the same form. Nevertheless, even if the values
we report further on are upwardly biased, the result we want to emphasize is the relative di↵erence
of multipliers between the two types of shocks, which remains una↵ected.
13For details on the estimation algorithm see Section 1.7 in the Appendix.
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the Foreign-financed shock. The biggest di↵erence is in the investment multiplier,
which is negative for a Home-financed shock (-1.3), but positive and large for the
Foreign-financed shock (3). Moreover, we find that in 99 percent of the accepted draws
the investment multiplier is higher for a Foreign-financed shock. For output this is at
86 percent and for consumption at 80 percent of the cases.
1.2.4 Robustness Checks
By changing the assumptions, sample used, or the econometric strategy we are able to
verify the robustness of our results. Notably, although in some cases our results are
weakened, it is important to mention that at least some evidence is always present in
favor of our baseline results and the economic intuition we obtain through the model.
Thus, we are never able to generate the reverse result of home-financed government
spending generating larger multipliers.
US Data
In the case of the US we have available a full decomposition of the variables of interest -
we have the exact data that comprise the following ratio: public external debt-to-public
domestic debt. This allows us to test the validity of our identification strategy by simply
including this ratio in the system and checking if the response of the ratio is as expected,
without restricting it a priori. We choose to include the ratio itself rather than public
debt and external debt in order to economize on degrees of freedom. The expectation
is that the ratio will decrease following a Home-debt financed government spending
shock and increase following a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock. As
can be seen in Figures (1.7.5) and (1.7.6) the ratio follows the anticipated pattern.
This verifies our expectations and hence lends validity to our initial identification and
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estimation across the whole sample.
Alternative Estimation Procedures
Here, we proceed by relaxing one of the assumptions in our original shock identification,
namely that output increases following a shock to government expenditures. In order
to make the shocks mutually exclusive, we assume external debt increases after the
business cycle shock. As can be seen from Figures (1.7.7), (1.7.8), (1.7.9) and (1.7.10)
the results are similar to our baseline specification with the output multiplier being
larger in the case of a Foreign-financed shock.
In Figures (1.7.11), (1.7.12), (1.7.13), and (1.7.14) we relax the assumption of con-
straining the size of the debt multiplier. Whilst in Figures (1.7.15), (1.7.16), (1.7.17),
and (1.7.18) we re-estimate our model using fixed e↵ects in growth rates.
1.3 Model Environment
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of households h 2 [0, 1],
of which a fraction s are rule-of-thumb workers (w) and the remaining fraction 1   s
are saver capitalists (k). The economy also includes perfectly competitive firms and
a government. Both types of households supply labor, and capitalists supply cap-
ital to competitive firms for the production of a final output, which is consumed
domestically.14Fiscal policy in the economy is determined by the government, which
finances unproductive public expenditures via lump-sum taxes, debt issued to the res-
ident households in the form of one-period non-contingent bonds, and debt issued to
14Having two types of households (workers and capitalists) is not essential in qualitatively obtaining
our central result that government spending shocks have di↵erential e↵ects on the real economy
depending on their source of debt financing. However, once we allow for this we are able to also
quantitatively replicate the magnitudes of fiscal multipliers following the two types of debt-financed
government spending shock.
29
CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF BORROWING
nonresident foreign investors in the form of one-period non-contingent bonds. That is,
the government finances its public expenditures by issuing two types of bonds, which
di↵er in the location of the holder, one is at home and the other is abroad. Foreign
investors are unmodelled and as such it is is simply assumed that the interest rate on
foreign-issued debt follows an exogenous debt-elastic rule. The government chooses the
mixture of expenditure-financing by minimizing the cost of financing its deficit. This
implies that the mixture of public debt will be endogenously determined through a
no-arbitrage condition equalizing the returns on home and foreign debt and be to a
large extent a↵ected by the degree of openness of the economy.
1.3.1 Preferences
Households are indexed by j 2 {w, k}. In order to lighten the notation, we drop the
index j from the parameters, but note that these can still be di↵erent across types of
households as will become the case when we calibrate the model.
Since households di↵er only in the composition of their budget constraints, for both
types of households j preferences are given by equation (3.2.1). They consume a CES
basket Cjt and supply labor n
j
t . The CES basket in (1.3.2) aggregates over the private
consumption good cjt and the public consumption good Gt.
Ut = Et
1X
t=0
 t
8><>:
⇣
Cjt    
 
njt
 '⌘1     1
1   
9>=>; (1.3.1)
Cjt =
✓
⌘
1
⇣
 
cjt
  (⇣ 1)
⇣ + (1  ⌘)
1
⇣
(Gt)
(⇣ 1)
⇣
◆ ⇣
(⇣ 1)
(1.3.2)
The period utility function U (.) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave
and twice continuously di↵erentiable. Et [.] is the expectation operator conditional
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on information available at time t and   is the subjective discount factor assumed
to satisfy 0 <   < 1.  denotes the share of labor in the utility function and   is
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We assume that  > 0 and   > 0. Cjt
in turn aggregates consumption of the private good cjt and the public good Gt. The
parameter ⇣ governs the elasticity of substitution between consumption of the private
good and consumption of the public good, such that when ⇣ ! 1, cjt and Gt are
perfect substitutes and when ⇣ ! 0 they are perfect complements. The parameter ⌘
determines the share of the two consumption goods in the basket.
Rule-of-Thumb Workers
Workers are assumed to behave in a rule-of-thumb fashion and thus in every period con-
sume all of their disposable income earned from supplying labor to competitive firms.
Expressed in terms of the private consumption good they face the budget constraint
cwt = Wtn
w
t   ⌧wt (1.3.3)
The left-hand side represents their expenditures where cwt is total worker consumption
and the right-hand side represents their labor income Wtnwt minus any lump-sum taxes
⌧wt levied from the government (transfers if < 0 ). The representative worker on the
interval h 2 [0, s] faces the simple optimization problem of choosing cwt and nwt to
maximize (3.2.1) subject to (1.3.3) taking the price Wt as given.
Capitalists
Capitalists in turn supply labor and capital to firms and have the ability to borrow
from the government as well as external financial markets. Their budget constraint in
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terms of the private consumption good is given by
ckt + it   bkf,t + bh,t = Wtnkt + rtkt 1 +Rh,t 1bh,t 1  Rkf,kbkf,t 1   ⌧ kt (1.3.4)
The left-hand side represents expenditures where ckt is consumption of the private
consumption good, it is investment in productive capital and bkf,t and bh,t denote the
purchase of debt made by capitalists at time t from external financial markets and
the domestic government respectively. If bkf,t > 0 and bh,t > 0 the capitalist is a
borrower. The right-hand side represents the capitalist’s income. Wtnkt is their labor
income, rtkt 1 is the rent from capital, and Rh,t 1bh,t 1 and Rkf,t 1b
k
f,t 1 denote the
gross returns from the two types of debt decisions made at time t 1. ⌧ kt > 0 are again
lump-sum taxes (transfers if < 0 ) from the government.
Domestic bonds are supplied by the government, so the domestic bond interest rate
is determined in equilibrium. This will imply domestic bonds will be in zero net
supply and their price will be determined through the capitalists’ Euler equation. To
determine private foreign debt we follow ? and specify a debt-elastic interest rate rule,
which depends on the household’s own debt position bkf,t. This ensures stationarity of
private foreign debt and closes the model accordingly.
Rkft =  (b
k
f,t) = r
⇤ + ⌫
⇣
exp(bkf,t   b¯kf )  1
⌘
(1.3.5)
The internal debt-elastic interest rate faced by the household assumes that the interest
rate is a sum of the world interest rate, r⇤, and a convex function of deviations of
their individual debt position, bkf,t, from the steady state value of private foreign debt,
b¯kf . As a result, capitalists will determine their optimal expenditures by considering
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the e↵ect that a change in their debt position has on the marginal cost of funds. 15
The parameter ⌫   0 represents a proxy for external financial market openness and is
further discussed below, when describing the determination of fiscal policy.
The representative capitalist on the interval h 2 [1  s, 1] chooses consumption ckt ,
labor supply nkt , as well as positions on domestic bonds bh,t and foreign bonds b
k
f,t to
maximize utility (3.2.1) subject to the budget constraint (1.3.4) taking prices Wt, rt,
Rkf,t and Rh,t as given.
1.3.2 Firms
On the production side output is produced using a Cobb-Douglas production function
over capital and total labor.
F (kt 1, Nt) = ztk↵t 1N
1 ↵
t (1.3.6)
where ↵ determines the share of capital in production. zt is an exogenous shock and
follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation coe cient ⇢ < 1.
ln(zt) = ⇢ ln(zt 1) + "t (1.3.7)
Firms choose kt 1 and Nt to maximize profits taking prices as given.
1.3.3 Fiscal Policy
Public spending Gt is financed via debt issued to domestic households bh,t, which is
then repaid in a lump-sum fashion through government transfers Tt, and to unmodelled
15We impose a steady state value of foreign debt b¯kf = 0, which implies that the equation admits
the solution bkf,t = b¯
k
f .
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foreign investors bgf,t. The government’s budget constraint is given by
Gt   Tt = bh,t  Rh,t 1bh,t 1 + bgf,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1 (1.3.8)
which implies that the budget deficit Gt Tt can be financed from two sources of debt;
domestic debt (bh,t  Rh,t 1bh,t 1) and foreign debt
 
bgf,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1
 
. The utility-
enhancing public expenditures are determined according to a fiscal rule, where current
government spending Gt depends on its past realization Gt 1 as well as a shock "
g
t .
We allow for a constant term in the fiscal rule, such that the steady-state level of
government spending is positive (g > 0).
Gt = 
g + ⇢gGt 1 + "
g
t (1.3.9)
In turn, taxes also follow a predetermined rule, whereby they depend on the share of
total debt relative to its steady state value B¯
Tt = 
✓
Bt 1
B¯
◆⇠
(1.3.10)
where , ⇠   0 and Bt is the sum of foreign and domestic debt
bf,t + bh,t = Bt
As in the case of the private sector, foreign public debt is determined by a debt-elastic
interest rate rule, but in which this case depends on the amount of foreign government
debt bgf,t issued.
Rgf,t =  (b
g
f,t) = r
⇤ + ⌫¯
 
exp(bgf,t   b¯g)  1
 
(1.3.11)
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The parameter ⌫¯   0 this time analogously represents a proxy for the openness of
external financial markets from the perspective of the government. If ⌫¯ = 0 it implies
that the government has perfect access and as such can issue debt abroad at the world
interest rate Rf,t = r⇤. As ⌫¯ increases external capital becomes more limited and
the interest rate the government faces increases with the size of debt issued in an
exponential fashion.16
Finally, we need to specify how the mixture of debt is determined. This will enable
us to pinpoint the location of debt holdings, which in turn will tell us from which
type of debt (Home or Foreign) government spending is financed. In order to do this
we momentarily introduce the parameter   into the government budget constraint for
illustrative purposes in the following way
Gt   Tt =   (bh,t  Rh,t 1bh,t 1)+ (1   )
 
bgf,t  Rgf,t 1bgf,t 1
 
(1.3.12)
Recall that our empirical model identifies the two uncontaminated cases of a fully
Home-debt financed and a fully Foreign-debt financed government spending shock.
Here, by allowing   to reflect the proportion of government debt that is issued domes-
tically we are able to nest the cases we study empirically in our theoretical model. As
such, when   = 0 it implies that total government debt is is issued to nonresidents,
whereas when   = 1 total government debt is only composed of debt issued domesti-
cally to resident households. As such, a government spending shock when   = 0 will
only transmit itself by issuing debt domestically and when   = 1 it will only transmit
itself by issuing debt abroad. In an endogenous setting where   is determined in equi-
librium it involves a problem where the government minimizes its costs of financing
16Possible reasons as to why access to external financial markets may not be perfect from the
perspective of the sovereign include the risk of default, a history of crises, political instability, among
others reasons.
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subject to its budget constraint up until the no-arbitrage condition of Rgf,t = Rh,t is
met. This endogenous government problem is simple to implement, and the mixture
of Home and Foreign debt that is issued is this setting would be to a large extent de-
termined by the degree of openness of external financial markets from the perspective
of the government, that is by the parameter ⌫¯. 17
1.3.4 Aggregation and Identities
Denote the aggregate quantity of a variable zt by Zt. Then,
Zt =
ˆ 1
0
zt(h)dh = sz
w
t + (1  s)zkt , z 2 {c, n}
Given that we assume that only capitalists have access to capital and asset markets
then aggregate investment, aggregate capital and aggregate debt are given by
Zt =
ˆ 1
0
zt(h)dh = (1  s)zkt , z 2
 
i, k, bh,t, b
k
f,t
 
Lump-sum transfers are assumed to be identical for both workers and capitalists
Zt =
ˆ 1
0
zt(h)dh = zt , z 2 {⌧t}
The current account CAt is defined as the sum of the trade balance TBt, and net
17Notice that if ⌫¯ !1 then access to external financial markets for the government is completely
blocked and is equivalent to the case where   = 0. However, since in practice we can only experiment
with finite values of ⌫¯, even if ⌫¯ is large, there will still be some movement in domestic debt (in
particular savings) in order to finance the issuance of debt abroad. Although qualitatively our results
remain una↵ected in this endogenous setting, we opt for the former approach where the government
behaves as an automaton and the mixture of debt is determined by changing  . This allows us to
perfectly capture the uncontaminated cases of a fully Home-debt or Foreign-debt financed government
spending shocks as in the empirical exercise.
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investment income on the country’s net foreign asset position.
TBt = Yt   Ct   It  Gt (1.3.13)
CAt = TBt  Rgf,t 1Bgf,t 1 (1.3.14)
Finally, the resource constraint of the economy is given by aggregating the budget
constraints of the households (1.3.4, (1.3.3) and that of the government (1.3.8).
Ct + It +Gt = F (Kt 1, Nt) + Bf,t  Rf,t 1Bf,t 1 +Bkf,t  Rkf,t 1Bkf,t 1 (1.3.15)
Note that an alternative way to model the financial friction for private borrowers would
be to include portfolio adjustment costs for capitalists. As mentioned above however,
we opt for specifying an internal debt-elastic interest rate for private foreign debt,
which increases exponentially by altering the parameter ⌫. As ⌫ ! 1 then private
foreign borrowing would be completely prevented and the final two terms in the resource
constraint would drop out.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
This section serves to illustrate the principal mechanism at work, and provide a robust
theoretical explanation for the results we observe in the data. As will be shown, the
crucial features that drive the di↵erential e↵ects of a government spending shock are
the extent that private investment is crowded in, or out. This is a direct consequence
of whether the private sector has (im)perfect access to external financial markets at
the time that the government spending shock hits the economy.
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1.4.1 No Private Access to External Financial Markets
In what follows we assume that private access to external markets by capitalists is
completely prevented. Although in theory this is achieved when ⌫ !1 we experiment
with several values for ⌫ and conclude that a value of ⌫ = 50 is enough to block all
private foreign debt holdings. With regards to the other parameters we choose them
illustratively and leave a more motivated assignment of values to Section (1.5) where
we report fiscal multipliers.18 Note that we perform the following exercise by setting
⌘w = ⌘k = 1. That is, we do not allow for the consumption of the public good to
enter the consumption baskets of neither workers nor capitalists. We opt for this since,
as will be shown further down, the introduction of government spending in the utility
function can alter the responses of consumption and confound the explanation in our
baseline example.
In order to explain the results of the uncontaminated Home-debt financed and Foreign-
debt financed government spending shocks that we find in the data, we exogenously
determine the mixture of debt by imposing values for the parameter  , which gov-
erns the location of deficit financing for the government.. The budget deficit is fully
financed domestically when   = 1 and fully abroad when   = 0. These results can
be considered as the extreme cases, which do not mirror optimal debt management
decisions of a government, but can explain the two shocks that we disentangle and
uniquely identify in the empirical investigation. The impulse responses of the model
are shown in Figure (1.7.19). As in the empirical section, the key feature, which drives
the di↵erential changes in output is the movement in investment. For the Foreign-debt
financed government spending shock investment increases, whereas for the Home-debt
18Even so, we experimented with several values for parameters
 
s, ⌘j , ⇣j
 
in a close range and found
that our results remained qualitatively una↵ected.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values for Household j
Parameter Name Label Value
Discount factor   0.99
World interest rate r⇤ 1 
Capital share ↵ 0.33
Share of consumption in CES consumption basket ⌘j 1
Elasticity of substitution in CES consumption basket ⇣j 2
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply 'j 1.5
Share of workers s 0.5
Depreciation rate   0.025
Output persistence ⇢ 0.9
Output standard deviation   0.01
Relative risk aversion  j 2
Share of labor supply  j 1
Debt-elastic interest rate coe cient (household) ⌫ [0, 1)
Government spending constant g 0.05
Government spending autocorrelation coe cient ⇢g 0.9
Debt-elastic interest rate coe cient (government) ⌫¯ [0,1)
Tax rate parameter  0.5
Tax rate exponent ⇠ 0.3
financed government spending shock investment decreases.
The mechanism that brings about these results can be understood by comparing
the capitalist’s budget constraint (1.4.1) with the resource constraint of the economy
(1.4.2).
ckt + it + bh,t = Wtn
k
t + rtkt 1 +Rh,t 1bh,t 1   ⌧ kt (1.4.1)
Ct + It +Gt = F (Kt 1, Nt) + Bf,t  Rf,t 1Bf,t 1 (1.4.2)
Clearly, since we do not allow capitalists to borrow from abroad, but only from the
domestic government the resource constraint will only contain foreign public bonds.
This implies that when a government spending shock hits the economy (whether it is
Home- or Foreign-debt financed) some components of the resource constraint will need
to adjust in order to absorb the increase in government expenditures. If the shock is
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Home-debt financed, which occurs when households are buying bonds from the gov-
ernment, then to meet the resource constraint they will need to reduce consumption
and/or investment, assuming that labor remains fixed. Due to a motivation for con-
sumption smoothing, which derives from the curvature of the utility function, it will
be investment that is required to adjust the most. If the government spending shock is
Foreign-debt financed however then a shock to government expenditures implies that
foreign bonds can be used to bu↵er this shock, and hence we should not observe such
a decline in consumption and/or investment, ceteris paribus. Thus, a Foreign-debt
financed government spending shock should not lead to such large levels of crowding
out of private investment as a Home-debt financed government spending shock.
However, at the same time there is also a wealth e↵ect operating (of di↵erent magnitude
for each shock), leading to a further heterogeneous response (of all variables) to the two
shocks. The wealth e↵ect comes about due to the expected increases of future taxation
making agents feeling poorer and increasing their labor supply to both shocks. First, in
the case of a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock households feel poorer
as they do not receive the interest rate payments that they would otherwise receive
under a Home-debt financed government debt shock. That is, the interest paid on
foreign bonds is simply wasted when private external borrowing is completely blocked.
This e↵ect implies that agents provide more labor in response to a Foreign-debt financed
government spending shock. On the other hand, the wealth e↵ect induces a second
di↵erentiation across the two shocks, this time deriving from the endogenous response
of economy in each case. Agents recognize that their consumption and/or investment
has to decline when the government finances the deficit by issuing domestic public debt
making them feel poorer and hence leading them to increase their labor relatively more
for a Home-debt financed shock than a Foreign-debt financed shock. In equilibrium,
we see that the second e↵ect dominates. implying that a utility specification, which
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could potentially feature lower wealth e↵ects would lead to a larger di↵erence in the
responses to the two shocks.19
Furthermore, since investment increases when the Foreign-debt financed government
spending shock hits, and capital takes time to build, we observe a further rise in labor
for the Foreign-debt financed government spending shock in the second period. This
is because the marginal product of labor increases due to the increase in investment,
thus incentivizing households to further increase their labor in the subsequent period.
Another feature, which we observe is the deterioration of the current account, which
occurs for either type of government spending shock. This result lends validity to the
assumptions we have imposed in the empirical section.
Finally, at this stage we do not stress the quantitative response of any of the endogenous
variables and the translation of the responses to fiscal multipliers. Although it is evident
that following a Foreign-debt financed government spending shock the response of
output is greater in magnitude, which would hence imply a larger multiplier, we leave
the quantitative exploration of multipliers to Section (1.5).
1.4.2 Private Access to External Financial Markets
The results presented above rely on the fact that households did not have access to
foreign financial markets. In this section we reverse this condition and assume that
there is full private access to external financing. We do this by setting ⌫ = 0.0007.
Figure (1.7.20) plots the impulse responses for the endogenous variables following a
Foreign-debt financed (  = 0) and Home-debt financed (  = 1) government spending
shock. The main di↵erence, is that now the response of investment is increasing follow-
19An extension of interest (not reported here) allowed for a Jaimovich-Rebelo-type utility specifica-
tion (Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009), where the strength of wealth e↵ects could be altered. We observed
that weaker wealth e↵ects led to a larger di↵erence in the output responses to the two shocks.
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ing both types of shocks. The reason for this increase is that in both cases capitalist
households can themselves now bu↵er the government spending shock by engaging in
private foreign borrowing, something which was ruled out before.
1.4.3 Varying the Debt-Elasticity of the Foreign Interest Rate
for the Private Sector
In order to reconcile the two cases where the private sector does, or does not have
access to foreign financial markets we experiment with the value of the private debt-
elastic parameter within the range 0  ⌫ < 0.03. Figure (1.7.21) plots the responses
of investment following a Home-debt financed or Foreign-debt financed government
spending shock for di↵erent values of the parameter governing the debt-elasticity of
the interest rate for households.
As agents increase their labor supply in response to both fiscal shocks because of a
wealth e↵ect, the marginal return to capital increases and agents would like to increase
their investment. When the shock is financed by issuing debt to foreign holders invest-
ment therefore always increases. On the other hand, for a domestically financed shock
the response of investment depends on the private sector’s access to foreign financial
markets. When access is high (i.e. the interest rate elasticity is low) agents borrow ex-
ternally to finance their investment and take advantage of their increased labor supply.
However, when access is low (i.e. the interest rate elasticity is high) external borrowing
is too costly and investment actually decreases as agents are obliged to spend a large
share of their income to purchase government bonds.
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1.5 Fiscal Multipliers
As there are several ways to measure fiscal multipliers, we follow the definition used in
the empirical investigation presented above. That is, the change in real GDP caused
by a one-unit increase in the government spending. Following Ilzetzki et al. (2013),
as multipliers may depend on the forecast horizon, we concentrate on reporting two
di↵erent fiscal multipliers. An impact multiplier defined as
Impact muliplier =
 yo
 go
✓
Y¯
G¯
◆
, which measures the ratio of the change in output to the change in government spending
at the same time the government spending innovation occurs, scaled by the share of
steady-state government spending to steady-state output. Furthermore, we also present
the cumulative multiplier at time T , which is defined as:
Cumulative muliplier =
PT
t=0 ytPT
t=0 gt
✓
Y¯
G¯
◆
, which measures the cumulative change in output per unit of additional government
spending, from the time the government spending innovation occurs until time T , scaled
by the share of steady-state government spending to steady-state output.
1.5.1 Matching Impulse Responses
Since our intention is to test the model’s predictions in confronting the data-reported
fiscal multipliers, we proceed in the spirit of Canova (2002) and examine whether
implications from the theory and the SVAR can be matched in dimensions of interest.
As such, we categorize the set of parameters ✓ = (✓1, ✓2), where ✓1 represents the
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parameters, which we keep fixed and ✓2 are parameters, which we have identified to play
a role in significantly altering the quantitative responses of the endogenous variables
in the model and thus experiment with values for them in a close range (see table 1.3).
For ✓1 we set the discount factor to 0.99 in order to achieve an interest rate of 1%,
which is the average quarterly interest rate on a 3-month US treasury bill. Following
conventional parameterisation in the macroeconomic literature we set the coe cient
of relative risk aversion (for both workers and capitalists) to 2, the share of capital
in production to 0.33, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (for both
workers and capitalists) to 1.5, the share of labor supply in the utility function (for
both workers and capitalists) to 1, and the depreciation rate to 0.025 (see Mendoza,
1991).20 ✓2 includes the share of the government consumption good in the aggregate
consumption basket (for both workers and capitalists), the strength of complementarity
between private and public consumption in the CES aggregator (for both workers and
capitalists), and the share of rule-of-thumb workers in the aggregation of households.
In order to avoid indeterminacies, when simulating a home-debt financed government
spending shock (  = 1), we set the debt-elastic interest rate for the government to
50 (no external access), whilst when simulating a foreign-debt financed government
spending shock (  = 0), we set the debt-elastic interest rate for the government to 0
(perfect external access). Finally, since we are interested in capturing the magnitudes
of fiscal multipliers reported in the data, which represent an upper bound, we set the
debt-elastic interest rate for capitalists to 50 in each simulation.
20In sensitivity analysis (not reported here, but available upon request) we experiment with several
other plausible values of ✓1-type parameters and conclude that our results remain una↵ected.
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Table 1.3: Parameter values for matching impulse responses
✓1
Discount factor   0.99
World interest rate r⇤ 1 
Capital share ↵ 0.33
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply (workers) 'w 1.5
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply (capitalists) 'k 1.5
Depreciation rate   0.025
Relative risk aversion (workers)  w 2
Relative risk aversion(capitalists)  k 2
Share of labor supply (workers)  w 1
Share of labor supply (capitalists)  k 1
Debt-elastic interest rate coe cient (capitalists) ⌫ 50
Debt-elastic interest rate coe cient (government) ⌫¯ (0,50)
✓2
Share of consumption in CES consumption basket (workers) ⌘w (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Share of consumption in CES consumption basket (capitalists) ⌘k (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Elasticity of substitution in CES consumption basket (workers) ⇣w (1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2)
Elasticity of substitution in CES consumption basket (capitalists) ⇣k (1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2)
Share of workers s (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.1)
We then simulate the model for the 55 parameter combinations and make a formal
comparison of impact impulse response coe cients by choosing the set of parameters
that gives the best match of simulated data responses to those generated by the data.
Formally, we minimize the sum of squared di↵erences between the impact responses of
the model- and data-generated impulse response functions.
D =
✓ 
IRF homemodel   IRF homedata
 2   ⇣IRF foreignmodel   IRF foreigndata ⌘2◆2 (1.5.1)
Figures(1.7.22) and (1.7.23) plot the various responses of investment for the full set of
parameter combinations. It is evident that for the vast majority of cases the response
of investment is as expected, positive for a home-debt financed government shock and
negative otherwise. Figure (1.7.24) plots the associated impact multipliers on output
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for the two government spending shocks as well as the di↵erence between the two. It is
evident that in a great number of cases the foreign-debt financed government spending
shock leads to higher output impact multipliers than a home-debt financed government
spending shock. Finally, Figures (1.7.25), (1.7.26) and (1.7.27) plot the cumulative
and impact multipliers on output, investment and consumption respectively for the
parameter combination that minimizes the distance matrix in (1.5.1). The impact
multiplier on output is 2.47 for a Foreign-shock and 1.64 for a Home-shock. For the
case of a Foreign-shock the model slightly underestimates the impact multiplier (3 in
the data), whilst for the case of the Home-shock it slightly overestimates it (1 in the
data). In similar fashion, the impact multiplier for investment for a Foreign-shock is
0.19 (3 in the data) and -1.1 for a Home-shock (-1.3 in the data), whilst is 0.84 for
consumption (3.1 in the data) and 0.42 (0 in the data) respectively for a Foreign- and
Home-shock. Notably, the parameter combinations, which achieve these results are
s = 0.4, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1 ⇣w = 1.6 and ⌘w = 0.9.
1.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Here, we perform a further decomposition of the sensitivity analysis implemented above
by altering each time subsets of ✓2, whilst keeping the remaining ✓2 fixed either at the
baseline calibration in table (3.1) or at the values minimizing (1.5.1). This allows us
to better understand the e↵ects of specific features of the model.
Utility-enhancing Government Spending
The parameter ⌘k determines the weight of the public consumption good in the con-
sumption basket for capitalists, whereas the parameter ⇣k governs the strength of the
complementarity between capitalist consumption of the private consumption good and
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capitalist consumption of the public good. Figure (1.7.28) plots the di↵erence in the
output multiplier following the two types of government spending shock for di↵erent
levels of these parameters. The left panel assumes no access to external financial mar-
kets by the private sector ⌫ = 50, whereas the right panel assumes a case of perfect
access ⌫ = 0.
When external market access is perfect (right panel), the greatest di↵erence in output
impact multipliers (higher for the foreign-debt financed government shock), although
only marginally, is generated when the share of government spending in the consump-
tion basket is high and complementarity is high. The reason for this is straightfor-
ward. An increase in government consumption leads to a complementary increase in
the private consumption good, boosting output. However, interestingly, when there is
no access to external financial markets (left panel), there is nonmonotonicity displayed
whereby the largest di↵erence in impact output multipliers is generated when the share
of government consumption is large, but the strength of complementarity is either very
low, or very high.
Share of Rule-of-Thumb households
Figure (1.7.29) plots impact and cumulative output multipliers following the two types
of government spending shock for di↵erent shares of rule-of-thumb behavior in the ag-
gregation of worker households. The remaining parameters are fixed at their distance-
minimizing values. Overall, we observe that Foreign-debt financed shocks lead to higher
output multipliers across all simulations. However, increasing the share of rule-of-
thumb households decreases both multipliers and even reduces them to 0 for extreme
values (s = 1). This is because as capitalists are depleted from the aggregation, al-
though consumption may be increasing due to the high share of rule-of-thumb-workers,
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productive investment is displaced leading to lower output responses.
1.6 Country Characteristics
In this section we attempt to better reconcile the empirical results with the theoretical
model. It is evident that the key mechanism through which the theoretical results are
obtained are due to crowding out of private investment and the extent to which both
the private sector and the government have access to external financial markets. In
Figure (1.7.30) we present impact multipliers on output, consumption and investment
following the two types of government spending shocks by splitting the sample of
countries according to three proxies for access to external financial markets in the spirit
of Ilzetzki et al. (2013). These proxies are i) the share of loans from non-resident banks
to GDP, ii) the number of crisis events, and iii) the variance of output. For the first
proxy we postulate that a higher share of non-resident bank loans for a country implies
a better access to foreign markets. Recent studies that make use of this measure,
especially for cases of developing countries are Bandyopadhyay et al. (2012) among
others. The other two proxies suggest that the more numerous the number of crises
and the higher the variance of output then countries will have lower access to foreign
markets.
For all endogenous variables and across all proxies, the results suggest that for countries
with higher access to external markets the di↵erence in the multipliers (especially for
output and investment) across the two types of shocks are smaller than for countries
with lower access. For example, for countries with a high variance of output, the impact
multiplier on output following a Home-debt financed shock is 2.51, whereas following
a Foreign-debt financed shock it is 5.23. For the countries with a low variance of
output the respective impact multipliers are 0.77 and 5.71. As the relative di↵erence
48
1.7. CONCLUSION
in multipliers is smaller for the low output variance subsamples, we conclude that this
verifies our theoretical predictions that a country’s ability to borrow from abroad is
a crucial feature in generating asymmetries. The share of accepted models where the
output multiplier is larger for a foreign shock over a home shock is 98 percent for
countries with high access and 70 percent for countries with low access.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we have asked the question: how do fiscal multipliers di↵er if a fiscal
shock is financed via home debt, or foreign debt. To answer this question we have
estimated an SVAR identified by placing conventional sign restrictions on the movement
of endogenous variables and by complementing them with magnitude restrictions on
the movement of government debt. For several specifications of the SVAR we find that
fiscal multipliers are larger when government spending is financed by debt that is held
in a foreign economy.
We validate our econometric methodology by building a model that can account for
these asymmetries. The fundamental mechanism that brings about this di↵erential
e↵ect of government spending financing is the extent to which private investment is
crowded in, or out following the two types of government spending shocks. When
the private sector can have access to foreign borrowing then investment tends to be
crowded in for both types of government spending shock and the output multipliers are
qualitatively similar. When private access to foreign borrowing is completely limited
then the di↵erence on the e↵ect of fiscal shocks is most emphasized. The specification
of preferences of households, and in particular the extent to which government con-
sumption can become utility enhancing drives a further quantitative di↵erence between
the e↵ects of the two fiscal shocks. Policy prescriptions in the ongoing crisis in the Eu-
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rozone should take these di↵erential e↵ects into account as requiring a government to
decrease its expenditures could potentially result in deeper than intended recessions if
the location of public debt holdings is not considered.
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Appendix
Data and variables
Unless stated otherwise nominal values are converted to real values using the price
deflator for private consumption expenditures. Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars.
Public Debt. The sum of total domestic and total external gross central government
debt-to-GDP. Whenever central government debt is not available we replace it with
general government debt. Source: Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011)
External Debt. The sum of total public and total private gross external debt-to-GDP.
Source: Reinhart and Rogo↵ (2011)
Output. Yt is gross domestic product. Source: World Bank
Government Expenditures. Gt is general government final consumption expendi-
ture. Source: World Bank
Consumption. Ctis final consumption expenditure. Source: World Bank
Investment. It is gross fixed capital formation. Source: World Bank
List of Countries in sample: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Japan, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nor-
way, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore,
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Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, USA,
Venezuela, Zambia.
Estimation algorithm
The estimation procedure consists of three steps. In the first step, we estimate the
reduced form VAR model. In the second step, we identify the structural shocks and
take into account identification uncertainty. The third step serves to take into account
estimation uncertainty. The steps are:
1. Estimate reduced form VAR: Given the number of lags proposed by Hannan-
Quinn (HQ) or Bayesian Information criterion (BIC), bp, V AR(bp) is estimated
by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with fixed e↵ects to obtain an estimate of
autoregressive coe cients and the variance-covariance of reduced form errors,c⌃u.
2. Identification restrictions: non-structural impulse responses function, C(L),
is related to the structural impulse responses function as B(L) = A 10 C(L) and
reduced form errors, ut, are related to structural errors as ut = A
 1
0 B"t. Impact
matrix, S = A 10 B, must satisfy”
⌃u = SS
0 (1.7.1)
The estimate of impact matrix, bS, is obtained by Cholesky decomposition of
estimated variance-covariance of reduced form errors, bS = chol(c⌃u). We use non-
uniqueness of the representation in (1.7.1) to derive the distribution of impulse
response functions by sign restrictions:
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• First, the k⇥k matrix P is constructed with draws from a standard normal
distribution, N (0, 1).
• The QR decomposition of P is derived, such that P = QR and QQ0 = I.
• The new impact matrix is constructed as bD = bSQ, and the corresponding
impulse responses function is retained whenever it satisfies sign restrictions.
• The steps 2-2 are repeated 1000 times. The IRF’s distribution is obtained
by retaining the impulse responses functions that satisfy sign restrictions.
3. Estimation uncertainty: to account for estimation uncertainty, we repeat steps
1-2 1000 times, each time with a new artificially constructed data sample, Y ⇤.
To construct data samples, we use block bootstrap, where blocks are individual
countries. The countries are selected by random drawing with replacement from
the pool of countries in original data set. The length of new data sample, n, is
the same as length of original data set.
The IRF’s point estimates and the related confidence bands are constructed by re-
taining the median along with the relevant percentiles of the distribution of retained
IRFs.
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Baseline results (section 1.2.3)
Estimates
Figure 1.7.1: IRFs to the government spending shock financed with home debt - baseline
estimates
Home financed G shock   
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case with variables: government consumption, real output, real household
final consumption, real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and
parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure 1.7.2: IRFs to the government spending shock financed with foreign debt - baseline
estimates
Foreign financed G shock
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case with variables: government consumption, real output, real household
final consumption, real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and
parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Multipliers
Figure 1.7.3: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with home
debt - baseline estimates
Multiplier − Home financed G shock   
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
Figure 1.7.4: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with foreign
debt - baseline estimates
Multiplier − Foreign financed G shock
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
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Robustness checks: US (section 1.2.4)
Estimates
Figure 1.7.5: IRFs to the government spending shock financed with home debt - baseline
estimates
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The IRFs are presented for the US with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final con-
sumption, real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter
uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure 1.7.6: IRFs to the government spending shock financed with foreign debt - baseline
estimates
Foreign financed G shock
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The IRFs are presented for the US with variables: government consumption, real output, real household final con-
sumption, real investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter
uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Robustness checks: no restrictions on output (section 1.2.4)
Estimates
Figure 1.7.7: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt
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The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
Figure 1.7.8: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt.
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The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
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Multipliers
Figure 1.7.9: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with home
debt
Multiplier − Home financed G shock   
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
Figure 1.7.10: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with foreign
debt
Multiplier − Foreign financed G shock
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
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Robustness checks: no restrictions on debt multipliers (section
1.2.4)
Estimates
Figure 1.7.11: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt
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The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
Figure 1.7.12: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt.
Foreign financed G shock
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
 
 
G
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
 
 
Y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
 
 
C
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
 
 
I
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
 
 
Public debt
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
 
 
External debt
The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
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Multipliers
Figure 1.7.13: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with home
debt
Multiplier − Home financed G shock   
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
Figure 1.7.14: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with foreign
debt
Multiplier − Foreign financed G shock
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
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Robustness checks: estimation with fixed e↵ects (section 1.2.4)
Estimates
Figure 1.7.15: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with home debt
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The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
Figure 1.7.16: IRFs to a government spending shock financed with foreign debt.
Foreign financed G shock
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The IRFs are presented for the variables: government consumption, real output, real household final consumption, real
investment, public debt and external debt. The dashed lines correspond to identification and parameter uncertainty of
one-standard deviation.
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Multipliers
Figure 1.7.17: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with home
debt
Multiplier − Home financed G shock   
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The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
Figure 1.7.18: Cumulative multipliers to the government spending shock financed with foreign
debt
Multiplier − Foreign financed G shock
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
 
Y
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
 
C
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
 
 
I
The cumulative multiplier is defined as the ratio between the accumulated response of the log di↵erence of variable of
interest over the log di↵erence of government consumption. The figure presents the cumulative multiplier for output,
consumption and investment.
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No private access to external financial markets (section 1.4.1)
Figure 1.7.19: Impulse response functions following a home-debt financed and foreign-debt
financed government spending shock
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100% home-financed shock,   = 1 (dashed red line), 100% foreign-financed shock,   = 0 (solid blue line). No private
access to external financial markets (⌫ = 50)
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Private access to external financial markets(section 1.4.2)
Figure 1.7.20: Impulse response functions following a home-debt financed and foreign-debt
financed government spending shock
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100% home-financed shock,   = 1 (dashed red line), 100% foreign-financed shock,   = 0 (solid blue line). Full private
access to external financial markets (⌫ = 0.0007)
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Figure 1.7.21: Di↵erence in the responses of investment following a home-debt financed and
a foreign-debt financed shock to government spending
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The top panel plots the di↵erence in the responses of investment following a home-debt financed government spending
shock,   = 1. The middle panel plots the di↵erence in the responses of investment following a foreign-debt financed
government spending shock ,   = 0. For both cases the private interest rate debt-elasticity varies between ⌫ = 0 (blue
solid line), ⌫ = 0.006 (green dashed line), ⌫ = 0.03 (red dashed line). The bottom panel denotes the di↵erences in the
two responses of investment for a range of the private interest rate debt-elasticity.
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Matching impulse responses (section 1.5.1)
Figure 1.7.22: Investment multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home
debt   = 1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.01
−0.008
−0.006
−0.004
−0.002
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Periods
Pe
rc
en
t
I (Home)
Multipliers are presented for di↵erent parameter combinations
Figure 1.7.23: Investment multipliers to a government spending shock financed with foreign
debt   = 0
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Multipliers are presented for di↵erent parameter combinations
Figure 1.7.24: Impact output multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home
  = 1 or foreign   = 0 debt   = 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
−2
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
Impact multipliers
 
 
Y (Home)
Y (Foreign)
Y (F) − Y (H)
Impact multipliers are presented for the full set of parameter combinations. Green line shows the di↵erence in the
impact multiplier between a foreign-financed and a home-financed government spending shock
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Figure 1.7.25: Cumulative multipliers for output to a government spending shock financed
with home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
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s = 0.4, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1, ⇣w = 1.6, ⌘w = 0.9
Figure 1.7.26: Cumulative multipliers for investment to a government spending shock financed
with home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
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Figure 1.7.27: Cumulative multipliers for consumption to a government spending shock fi-
nanced with Home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
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s = 0.4, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1, ⇣w = 1.6, ⌘w = 0.9
67
Sensitivity analysis (section 1.5.2)
Figure 1.7.28: Di↵erence in impact output multipliers to a government spending shock fi-
nanced with home   = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
ζk
ν=50
ηk
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 O
ut
pu
t M
ul
tip
lie
r (
F−
H
)
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
x 10−4
ζk
ν=0
ηk
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 O
ut
pu
t M
ul
tip
lie
r (
F−
H
)
Impact multipliers are presented for di↵erent levels of private sector access to external financial markets (left panel no
access ⌫¯ = 50, right panel complete access ⌫¯ = 0). Remaining parameters are set at baseline calibration (see table 3.1)
Figure 1.7.29: Cumulative multipliers to a government spending shock financed with home
  = 1 or foreign debt   = 0
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Cumulative multipliers are presented for di↵erent shares of rule-of-thumb consumers s = {0.40.6, 0.8, 1}. Remaining
parameters are fixed at ⌫¯ = 50, ⇣k = 1.4, ⌘k = 0.1, ⇣w = 1.6, ⌘w = 0.9
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Coordination under the Zero
Lower Bound1
2.1 Introduction
“Our fiscal stance is not based on a single budget voted for by a single
parliament, but on the aggregation of eighteen national budgets and the EU
budget. Stronger coordination among the di↵erent national fiscal stances
should in principle allow us to achieve a more growth-friendly overall fiscal
stance for the euro area.”
Mario Draghi, Annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole
(22.8.2014)
In the context of the ongoing European debt crisis, a topical debate is taking part
in European policymaking circles involving the importance of fiscal sustainability and
1The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and should not be taken to necessarily represent the
views of the European Commission. All analysis in the paper is a consequence of the author’s calculations based on
published and freely available material.
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CHAPTER 2. FISCAL COORDINATION
fiscal coordination. On the one hand, debt-to-GDP ratios are substantial, calling for
sizable fiscal adjustments. On the other hand, several voices observing the slow recovery
of the Eurozone are calling for a more moderate and back-loaded fiscal adjustment with
a focus on growth-friendly outcomes. At the same time, weak inflation dynamics have
curbed the European Central Bank’s (ECB) ability to lower nominal interest rates in
order to o↵er monetary stimuli to the Eurozone.
In his classic study on fiscal federalism, Oates (1999) argues that government pol-
icy at the local level cannot use stabilization tools e↵ectively, and ultimately resorts
on beggar-thy-neighbour policies, which are likely to lead to suboptimal outcomes.
Instead, it should be the role of the central government to undertake fiscal policy pro-
grams to achieve a wider economic stabilization. More recently, and in the context of
the European Union (EU), the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was introduced with
the objective of creating a set of rules that ensures countries in the EU will maintain
economically sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies.
The aim of this paper is to construct a model, through which we can study strate-
gies of fiscal coordination across regions of the Eurozone. The paper contributes to
these debates by o↵ering a theoretical understanding of the merits of asymmetric fiscal
adjustments in the North and South Eurozone under two di↵erent monetary policy
arrangements. One where the nominal interest is able to endogenously adjust to eco-
nomic outcomes, and one where it is constrained to be at the zero-lower bound (ZLB),
as in the current environment in the Eurozone. Thus, the question it seeks to answer
is ’are there gains from fiscal coordination?’
We approach this issue by building a two-region, two-sector (tradable-nontradable)
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with nominal rigidities, of the
class that has now become the standard vehicle for macroeconomic analysis in central
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2.1. INTRODUCTION
banks and policy institutions. The model closely follows Ratto et al. (2009) and Vo-
gel (2014), but is similar in spirit to the now standard international macroeconomic
models of Stockman and Tesar (1995), Benigno and Thoenissen (2008), and Erceg and
Linde (2013). The model features nominal rigidities in prices and wages, a distinc-
tion of households into Ricardian and liquidity-constrained as in Gali et al. (2007), a
relatively rich fiscal sector with productive government investment, and a Taylor-type
rule on monetary policy. We then calibrate the model to the EU South and EU North
and analyze a particular fiscal policy scenario where the EU North undertakes a fis-
cal expansion, and the EU South undertakes a fiscal consolidation. This scenario is
constructed on the basis of identifying from the data the extent to which these two
regions have a positive, or negative fiscal gap (that is, whether their fiscal adjustment
implies an expansion, or consolidation in their structural balance). Since the academic
and policy literature o↵ers a number of complementary methods to assess fiscal sus-
tainability, we opt for evaluating the aggregate fiscal stance of the regions in the model
by exploiting data from the European Commission’s Winter Forecast 2015 (ECFIN
(2015a)) and the guidelines on fiscal adjustment laid out by the Stability and Growth
Pact. This scenario then informs a number of simulations to study the e↵ects of a
coordinated fiscal policy in the Eurozone.
The results suggest that when monetary policy is constrained by the zero-lower bound
the EA South benefits from the expansion in the EA North, although it is in itself
undertaking a fiscal consolidation. The reason is that in this setting the spillovers from
the North’s expansion become more sizable. Empirical evidence in the literature widely
confirms the statistical and quantitative significance of local fiscal policy spillovers (e.g.
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011); Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013); Hebous and
Zimmermann (2012); Carlino and Inman (2013), among others), lending validity to
our theoretical predictions. The key di↵erence between a ZLB and an active monetary
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arrangement following a Taylor rule targeting inflation and the output gap, is the
presence of an interest rate e↵ect, which is under operation only in the latter case.
Under an active monetary policy the North’s expansion (which has a high share in
Euro-area GDP) triggers a nominal interest rate increase leading to an increase in the
real interest rate. As a result, the Euro appreciates leading to a loss in competitiveness.
In contrast, under a ZLB, fiscal policy actions lead to an overall increase in Euro
inflation causing the real interest rate to drop. This then implies an outflow of capital
from the EA causing a depreciation of the exchange rate, and hence a loss in output.
Interestingly, the ZLB acts as a monetary policy expansion when accompanied by an
aggregate fiscal expansion.
To my knowledge this is the first paper studying the coordination of fiscal policies in
a large-scale quantitative model, and calibrated to a pertinent scenario identified from
the data. An important paper in the field is by Gali and Monacelli (2008), which o↵ers
though a normative analysis on the topic showing that inflation should be stabilized at
the aggregate level, whereas fiscal policy has a country-specific stabilization role. Our
paper di↵ers from theirs in the richness, and hence size of the model, as well as to the
particular scenario simulated, which is arguably a good approximation of the policies
that Eurozone countries are called to undertake in the current juncture. Recent work
by in ’t Veld (2013) uses a multi-country model similar to the one in this paper to study
the e↵ects of fiscal consolidations in seven Eurozone economies during the crisis years
of 2011-2013. Our work, emphasizes the importance of contrasting fiscal adjustments
in Eurozone countries, and how these can stabilize the overall Euro area, in the face
of di↵erent monetary policy assumptions. This paper is also related to Beetsma and
Jensen (2005), who explore the welfare consequences of coordinating simple fiscal policy
rules in the context of a monetary union. Other, studies investigating the e↵ects of
fiscal and monetary policy coordination in this setting include Forlati (2006); Gnocchi
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(2007); Flotho (2012), as well as recent work by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and described in Benes et al. (2013), among others. In the context of a fiscal union,
Werning and Farhi (2012) emphasize the role that emerges for government intervention
in insuring against aggregate shocks.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section (3.2) we outline the
model in question. In Section (3.3) we perform a quantitative exploration by first
describing the identification of fiscal gaps, which then inform a number of policy-
relevant simulations. Finally, in Section (3.4) we hint at possible interesting extension
of the current analysis and conclude.
2.2 Model
The model consists of a world comprised of three regions k 2 {SOEA,NOEA,ROW}
and calibrated to the Eurozone South (SOEA), the Eurozone North (SOEA), and a
rest-of-the-world aggregate (ROW ). Each region is populated by households, firms and
a benevolent government. There is a union-wide monetary authority. Households are
distinguished into liquidity constrained, thus only consuming their disposable income,
or Ricardian, by having perfect access to financial markets. Domestic and foreign firms
produce a continuum of di↵erentiated goods, consumed in the domestic economy or
abroad.2
2.2.1 Production
In each region there are monopolistically competitive final good producers indexed by
j operating on the tradable (t) and non-tradable sector (nt) sector. They produce a
2The exposition of the model closely follows Vogel (2014), who describes an environment to study
the e↵ects of structural reforms under the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
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variety of the tradable and non-tradable good, which is an imperfect substitute for
varieties produced by other final good producers. Gross output in each sector is given
by OJt with J 2 {T,NT} and is a CES aggregate of varieties Ojt produced by individual
final good producers j
OJt ⌘
ˆ 1
0
 
Ojt
 ( j 1)/ j
dj
  j/( j 1)
where  j reflects the elasticity of substitution between varieties j within sector J . We
allow for the elasticity of substitution between the tradable and nontradable sectors
to be di↵erent in order to reflect sector specific price mark-ups. The demand function
that a firm j faces for its output Oj is then given by
Ojt = (P
j
t /P
J
t )
  jOJt (2.2.1)
Firms in the tradable sector sell consumption and investment goods to domestic and
foreign households; intermediate inputs to domestic and foreign firms; and consumption
and investment goods to domestic and foreign governments. In turn, firms in the non-
tradable sector sell consumption goods to domestic households; intermediate inputs to
domestic firms; and consumption and investment goods to the domestic government.
All private investment in physical capital therefore consists of tradable goods whereas
all government consumption consists of nontradable goods.
Each individual firm j produces output Ojt by combining value-added (Y
j
t ) and in-
termediate inputs (N jt ) using a CES technology. in turn, value-added is produced
using a Cobb-Douglas production function with capital (Kjt ), labor (L
j
t) and public
infrastructure capital (KGt )
Ojt =
⇥
(1  sj)1/ N (Y jt )( N 1)/ N + (sj)1/ N (N jt )( N 1)/ N
⇤ N/( N 1)
(2.2.2)
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Y jt = A
j
t
 
ujtK
j
t
 1 ↵  
Ljt
 ↵  
KGt
 ↵g (2.2.3)
where sj is the steady-state share of intermediate inputs in output and  N is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs and value-added. Ajt denotes
total factor productivity, and ujt denotes capacity utilization.
Labor Ljt is a CES aggregate of labour services supplied by individual households i and
is given by
Ljt ⌘
ˆ 1
0
(Li,jt )
(✓ 1)✓di
 ✓/(✓ 1)
where ✓ is the degree of substitutability between di↵erent types of labour i.
Ricardian households (to be elaborated upon below) own the firm and receive real
profits given by
⇧jt = p
j
tO
j
t   pN,jt N jt   wtLjt   rjtpItKjt   adjp,jt   adju,jt (2.2.4)
where wt is the real wage, r
j
t is the rental rate of capital, p
N,j
t is the price of intermediate
inputs, and pIt denotes the price of capital.
3 We also assume that firms face constraints
in their capacity to adjust the price of output, as well as their capacity utilization.
Arguably, these adjustment costs can be the result of technological, administrative or
regulatory constraints on production. They are given by the following convex functional
form
adjP,jt ⌘
 p,j
2
(⇡jt )
2Y jt , where ⇡
j
t ⌘
P jt
P jt 1
  1 (2.2.5)
adju,jt ⌘ pItKjt
⇣ u1
2
 
ucapjt   1
 
+
 u2
2
 
ucapjt   1
 2⌘
(2.2.6)
Firms choose labour, capital, capacity utilization, the price and volume of output j,
3Note that lower case letters denote ratios. For example pjt ⌘ P jt /Pt is the price of final good j
relative to the GDP deflator.
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to maximize profits (3.2.15) subject to their demand function (2.2.1), production tech-
nology (2.2.2) and(2.2.3), and price and capacity utilization adjustment costs (2.2.5) -
(2.2.6).
The price mark-up is defined from the FOC with respect to the volume of output.
Ojt : ⌘
j
t = 1 
1
 j
   p,j
✓
 Et
 rt+1
 rt
⇡jt+1   ⇡jt
◆
(2.2.7)
where ⌘jt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the production technology and
 rt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint of the Ricardian
households (to be explained below). As can be seen, equation (2.2.7) defines the price
mark-up as a function of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods of
sector j and price adjustment costs.
Following the empirical literature, which supports price setting behavior of a backward-
looking nature we assume that a fraction 1  " of firms index prices to past inflation.
This assumption then implies the following redefinition of the price mark-up equation
⌘jt = 1 
1
 j
   p,j
✓
 Et
 rt+1
 rt
 
"Et⇡
j
t+1 + (1  ")⇡jt 1
   ⇡jt◆ , where 0  "  1
(2.2.8)
Notably, given a symmetry of objective functions and constraints across firms j in
sector J , the superscript j for individual firms can be dropped to obtain aggregate
equations for the tradable and nontradable sectors.
2.2.2 Households
Each region is populated by a continuum of households i 2 [0, 1]. A share 0  sl  1
of these households are assumed to be liquidity-constrained and thus behave in a rule-
of-thumb fashion. They cannot make investment decisions, nor purchase/sell assets
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in financial markets. In each period they consume their disposable income. A share
sr = 1   sl of households is Ricardian, have full access to asset markets and optimize
intertemporally. Period utility is identical for both household types and additively sep-
arable in consumption (C it) and leisure (1 Lit) with habit persistence in consumption
(h):
U(C it , 1  Lit) =
1
1 +  C
 
C it   hCt 1
 1+ C
+
#
1  
 
1  Lit
 1 
(2.2.9)
where # is the weight of leisure in utility and  is the inverse of the labour supply
elasticity.
Ricardian Households
Ricardian households have full access to financial markets. They hold one-period non-
contingent domestic government bonds and one-period non-contingent foreign bonds.
They also hold the real capital stock of the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Ri-
cardian households receive labour income, returns on financial assets, rental income
from renting capital to firms, and the profits from domestic firm ownership in both the
tradable and nontradable sectors. Their budget constraint is given by
(1 + ⌧Ct )p
C
t C
r
t +
X
J
pI,Jt I
J
t +
BGt
Pt
+ et
BFt
Pt
= (1 + it 1)
BGt 1
Pt
+
 
1 + iFt 1 + r
p
t
 
et
BFt 1
Pt
+
X
J
  
1  ⌧Kt
 
rJt 1 + ⌧
K
t  
K,J
 
pI,Jt 1K
J
t 1
+(1  ⌧Wt )wtLrt +
X
J
⇧Jt  
T rt
Pt
 adjWt (2.2.10)
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where J 2 {T,NT}. BGt are nominal domestic government bonds carrying the nominal
interest rate it and BFt are nominal foreign bonds carrying a nominal interest rate i
F
t .
We assume that these foreign bonds are traded in asset markets located outside the
currency union. We assume that the interest rate on foreign bonds is subject to a risk
premium rpt , which depends on the volume of debt issued. et is the nominal exchange
rate defined as the price of domestic currency in foreign currency. In turn, KJt is the
real capital stock in sector J , IJt is the corresponding investment, r
J
t is the rental rate
of capital, and  K,J denotes the sector specific depreciation rate. In addition, we allow
for a number of fiscal policy instruments and assume that wage income is taxed at the
rate ⌧W , corporate income at the rate ⌧K and consumption at the rate⌧C . T rt < 0
denotes lump-sum taxes (transfers if > 0). Price deflators for the consumption and
investment good are given by pCt and p
I,J
t .
We also introduce wage adjustment costs in order to reflect the empirically plausible
feature of symmetric nominal wage rigidity
adjWt ⌘
 w
2
 
⇡Wt
 2
Lt
The law of motion for capital in sector J is given by
KJt = I
J
t + (1   K,J)KJt 1 (2.2.11)
Ricardian households choose consumption, positions on domestic and foreign bonds, in-
vestment, and labor to maximize their utility (3.2.1) subject to their budget constraint
(2.2.10) and the law of motion for capital (2.2.11). From the first order condition on
foreign bonds we can derive the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition given
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by
it = i
F
t + Et
 et+1
et
+ rpt (2.2.12)
The UIP determines the nominal exchange rate of the euro vis-a`-vis the ROW currency.
Since members of the Eurozone share the common currency, this implies a fixed nominal
exchange rate between the SOEA and NOEA aggregate. As a result of the risk premia
which arise this causes interest rate di↵erentials within the Euro Area. Finally, the real
interest rate is defined as the nominal interest rate minus the expected percent change
in the GDP deflator
Rt = it   Et⇡t+1
Liquidity-constrained Households
Liquidity-constrained households behave in a rule-of-thumb fashion and do not face
an intertemporal decision problem. They thus simply consume their entire disposable
income in each period. Real consumption of household l is hence given by the net wage
income minus the lump-sum tax
(1 + ⌧Ct )p
C
t C
l
t = (1  ⌧Wt )wtLlt   T lt
Similar to Ricardian households, the liquidity-constrained provide di↵erentiated labour
services with an elasticity of substitution between di↵erent varieties given by ✓.
Wage-setting
Wage-setting is governed by a trade union acting on behalf of both types of household,
which maximizes a joint utility function for each type of labour i. We assume that this
joint utility function is a population-weighted average over Ricardian and liquidity-
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constrained households’ individual utilities (given by equation (3.2.1)). The wage rule
is then obtained by equating a weighted average of the marginal utility of leisure to
a weighted average of the marginal utility of consumption of both household types
multiplied by their real wage and adjusted for a wage mark-up (⌘Wt ). This wage rule
is given by
(1  !)U r1 L,t + !U l1 L,t
(1  !)U rC,t + !U lC,t
=
(1  ⌧Wt )wt
(1 + ⌧Ct )p
C
t
⌘Wt
where U i1 L,t denotes the marginal utility with respect to leisure and U
i
C,t denotes the
marginal utility with respect to consumption for each household type i.
The wage mark-up can then be defined as
⌘Wt = 1 
1
✓
    
w
✓
Et

 rt+1
 rt
 
⇡Wt+1   ⇡t
    ⇡Wt   ⇡t 1  
and depends on the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between varieties of labor
(1/✓). Fluctuations of the wage mark-up around (1/✓) arise from the assumption of
wage stickiness. In the presence of wage stickiness, the fraction 1   "w of workers
(0  "w  1) index wage growth ⇡Wt to wage inflation in the previous period leading
to the following specification the wage mark-up
⌘Wt = 1 
1
✓
    
w
✓
Et

 rt+1
 rt
 
⇡Wt+1   (1  "w)⇡t
    ⇡Wt   (1  "w)⇡t 1  
where  rt denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the Ricardian household associated to
their budget constraint.
Aggregation
If X it is the per-capita term of household-specific variables (where X
i
t 2 {C it , Lit, T i})
then we define their aggregate aggregate counterpart as Xt ⌘
´ 1
0 X
i
tdi = (1  sl)Xrt +
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slX lt . Thus aggregate consumption is given by
Ct = (1  sl)Crt + slC lt
and aggregate labor by
Lt = (1  sl)Lrt + slLlt , with Lrt = Llt
2.2.3 Fiscal Policy
Government expenditures consist of consumption and investment purchases. Income
consists of revenues from consumption taxes, labour taxes, corporate taxes and a lump-
sum levy. The government deficit is defined as
DFt = p
C
t (Gt+I
G
t )+⌧
C
t p
C
t Ct+
X
J
⌧Wt wtL
J
t +
X
J
⌧Kt
h
P Jt O
J
t   PN,Jt NJt   wtLJt    K,JrJt pI,Jt KJt 1
i
 Tt
and the government’s budget constraint is then given by
DFt +B
G
t = (1 + it 1)B
G
t 1
We assume that real government expenditures (Gt) and investment (IGt ) are kept con-
stant in real terms. The stock of public infrastructure that enters the production
function of private firms (equation 2.2.3) has the following law of motion
KGt = I
G
t + (1   G)KGt 1
We assume that consumption, corporate income, and lump-sum taxes are exogenous.4
4Their definitions will be provided below.
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To ensure determinacy of the equilibrium and a non-explosive solution for debt, we
follow Leeper (1991) and assume that the labour tax is used to stabilize the debt-to-
GDP ratio. It targets deviations in government debt-to-GDP from a target level of
government debt-to GDP
⇣
Bt
PtYt
⇤⌘
, and in order to prevent large oscialltions it also
targets changes in government debt-to-GDP itself with weight ⌧ def .
 ⌧Wt = ⌧
b
✓
BGt
PtYt
  B
G
t
PtYt
⇤◆
+ ⌧ def 
✓
BGt
Pt
◆
2.2.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is modeled using a Taylor rule that allows for a smoothing of the
interest rate responses to region-wide inflation ⇧ct and the region-wide output gap Yˆt.
it = ⇢iit 1 + (1  ⇢i)
⇣
r + ⇡⇤ +  ⇡(⇧Ct   ⇡⇤) +  yYˆt
⌘
The union central bank can therefore adjust its policy rate it in response to deviations
of union-wide average CPI inflation from a constant inflation target ⇡⇤ as well as to
the output gap. The weights placed on the two objectives are given by  ⇡ and  y.
Following standard practice of output gap calculations in the fiscal and monetary policy
surveillance literature we derive the output gap from a production function framework.
We thus do not opt for a definition of the output gap as being calculated as the
di↵erence between actual and e cient output. More specifically, the output gap is
defined as deviations of factor utilization from its long-run trend:
Yˆt ⌘ ↵ ln(Lt/Lsst ) + (1  ↵) ln(ut/usst )
The variables Lsst and u
ss
t are not steady-state values but moving average specifications
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of labor and the capacity utilization rate
Lsst = ⇢LL
ss
t 1 + (1  ⇢L)Lt
usst = ⇢uu
ss
t 1 + (1  ⇢u)uJt
2.2.5 International Linkages
Let Zt 2 {C,G, IG} be the demand by private households and the government for
private consumption, government consumption and government investment. In order to
facilitate aggregation, we assume that both the private and public sector have identical
preferences across tradable and nontradable goods, and are given by the following CES
aggregator
Zt =
h
(1  stnt)1/ tnt
 
ZNTt
 ( tnt 1)/ tnt + s1/ tnttnt  ZTTt  ( tnt 1)/ tnti tnt/( tnt 1) (2.2.13)
where ZNT is an index of demand for the nontradable varieties, whereas ZTT is a
bundle of domestically produced (ZT ) and imported (ZM) tradable goods
ZTTt =
h
(1  sM)1/ M
 
ZTt
 ( M 1)/ M + s1/ MM  ZMt  ( M 1)/ Mi M/( M 1) (2.2.14)
The elasticity of substitution between the bundles of non-tradable and tradable goods
is  tnt. The elasticity of substitution between the bundles of domestically produced
and imported tradable goods is  m. The steady-state shares of tradable goods in Z
and of imports ZTT are stnt and sm, respectively. All investment in physical capital in
the tradable and non-tradable sectors consists of tradable goods.
The CES aggregate (2.2.13) combining tradable and nontradable goods then implies
85
CHAPTER 2. FISCAL COORDINATION
the following demand functions
ZTt = stnt
✓
P Tt
PCt
◆  tnt  
Ct +Gt + I
G
t
 
(2.2.15)
ZNTt = (1  stnt)
✓
PNTt
PCt
◆  tnt  
Ct +Gt + I
G
t
 
(2.2.16)
The intermediate inputs in sector J 2 {T,NT} are also composites of tradable and
non-tradable inouts analogously to equations (2.2.13) and (2.2.14) with tradable inter-
mediate inputs either domestically produced or imported:
NT,Jt =

(1  sJtnt)1/ tnt
⇣
NNT,Jt
⌘( tnt 1)/ tnt
+
 
sJtnt
 1/ tnt ⇣
NTT,Jt
⌘( tnt 1)/ tnt  tnt/( tnt 1)
(2.2.17)
NTT,Jt =
h
(1  sM)1/ M
 
NTt
 ( M 1)/ M + s1/ MM  NMt  ( M 1)/ Mi M/( M 1) (2.2.18)
This gives demand functions for tradable and non-tradable intermediates analogously
to (2.2.15) and (2.2.16):
NT,Jt = s
J
tnt
✓
P Tt
PN,Jt
◆  tnt
NJt (2.2.19)
NNT,Jt = (1  sJtnt)
✓
PNTt
PN,Jt
◆  tnt
NJt (2.2.20)
Combining the demand functions corresponding to (2.2.14) and (2.2.18) gives the im-
port demand equation
Mt = sM
✓
etPMt
P Tt
◆  M  
ZTt +
X
J
IJt +
X
J
NT,Jt
!
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Import prices are given by
pMt =
24 FX
f=1
 
sfm
eft P
T,f
t
P xt
!1  f351/(1  f )
where sfm is the share of the country of origin f in domestic imports and p
T,f
t is the
price of tradables set by producers in country f . Notably, since there are three regions
in the model, from the perspective of region SOEA, f 2 {NOEA,ROW}.
Bilateral imports from the individual model regions (f), which are foreign regions from
the perspective of the domestic economy, are given by
M ft = s
f
 
eft P
T,f
t
etPMt
!  f
Mt
Exports of the domestic economy (Xt) equal the sum of bilateral imports of foreign
regions, which implies that the trade balance of the domestic economy is denoted as
TBt ⌘ pTt Xt   etpMt Mt
The current account is then given as the sum of the trade balance and interest income
on the net foreign asset position (NFA)
CAt ⌘ iFt 1etBFt 1 + pTt Xt   etpMt Mt
The law of motion for the (NFA) position is denoted as
etB
F
t = (1 + i
F
t 1)etB
F
t 1 + p
T
t Xt   etpMt Mt
Finally, in order to ensure stability of the NFA position we assume a closure rule
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that relates the external risk premium in (2.2.12) to the NFA position of the domestic
economy relative to a baseline (target) position equal to B¯⇤ (as in Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003)).
rpt =  r¯
✓
etBFt
PtYt
  B¯⇤
◆
An increase (decrease) in the NFA position of the domestic economy increases (de-
creases) the risk on foreign bonds relative to domestic bonds. A decrease (increase)
in the relative risk of domestic assets in response to a rise (fall) in the domestic NFA
position increase (decreases) domestic consumption and investment demand, which
deteriorates the trade balance and stabilizes the NFA position.
2.3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we describe the parameterisation of the model, emphasizing the dif-
ferences across the three regions of the model, and then proceed with presenting the
quantitative exercise.
2.3.1 Calibration
Recall that the model consists of a symmetric three-region world, a Southern Euro
area aggregate (SOEA), a Northern Euro area aggregate (NOEA), as well as a rest-of-
the-world block (ROW).5 SOEA corresponds to 28.8% of Euro area GDP and NOEA
accounts for 71.2% of Euro area GDP. We can distinguish between three types of
parameters in the model. First, those pertaining to the model’s steady state in the
long-run, and which are assumed to be common to all three regions. Second, those
5The South is comprised of: ES, IT, PT, MT. The North is comprised of: BE, DE, EE, IE, FR,
NL, AT, FI, SK, LV, LT, LU, SI. We exclude GR and CY as they are currently under an economic
adjustment program.
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a↵ecting the model’s short-to-medium run dynamics, but common to all regions. And
a third category of parameters, which serve to explicitly di↵erentiate each region in the
model, and as will be described a↵ect both the model’s dynamics and convergence in
the long run.
The parameterisation of the model’s steady state in the long run is obtained using the
AMECO database, public finance statistics and input-output tables. For parameters,
which a↵ect the model’s dynamics in the short-medium run (strength of substitution
elasticities, nominal and real frictions, habits in consumption, fiscal and monetary pol-
icy response parameters) we assume the values based on the estimation of a richer
model variant by Ratto et al. (2009) and Kollmann et al. (2014). The model outlined
here, is a nested version of the ones found in these studies and thus includes common
model features. We assume that such model parameters are common to all regions as
the option to calibrate them to the corresponding Euro area countries would be pro-
hibitive given the model’s size. Finally, parameters that are region-specific include the
long run debt-to-GDP ratios, as well as the share of liquidity-constrained households.
For the debt-to-GDP ratio we employ the AMECO database, which results in 66.6%
for NOEA and 106.8% in SOEA. Since there is empirical disagreement in appropriate
values for such shares in the data, we assume that this share is higher in SOEA (0.5)
than in NOEA (0.3). Arguably, this is a good approximation of the current environ-
ment in these regions. Table (2.1) reports the calibrated parameter values and targeted
ratios.
2.3.2 Identifying Fiscal Gaps
There are several ways to identify the required fiscal adjustment for the two regions
in the model. Most methods in the literature rely in normative calculations of a
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country’s level of fiscal sustainability. As such, assessing whether a current fiscal stance
is sustainable turns out to be both a problematic, as well as a controversial exercise.
At a fundamental level, a government’s fiscal stance should be deemed sustainable if
the government’s budget constraint is satisfied. However, since the government budget
constraint is intertemporal and forward-looking this does not seem to solve the problem
in practice.
Approaches in the Literature
Here, we briefly describe the main methods proposed in the literature, emphasizing the
ones, which are similar in spirit to the one opted for in this paper. For a full overview
of approaches assessing fiscal sustainability see Chalk and Hemming (2000), who also
describe how these approaches have been used in IMF work. Buiter (1995) also surveys
a range of empirically implementable indicators of fiscal sustainability including: the
public debt-to-GDP ratio, the one-period primary gap, the permanent primary gap,
discounted public debt, as well as the long-run inflation rate implied by the specific
fiscal plan.
Polito and Wickens (2011) propose an index of fiscal sustainability derived from the
government’s inter-temporal budget constraint. The index is constructed by measuring
the distance of the existing level of government debt from a forecast of the present value
of current and future deficits derived from a VAR forecasting model of the economy.
Carnot (2014) proposes a simple ’rule-of-thumb’ for evaluating the e↵ectiveness of fiscal
policies. This rule links fiscal policy to a balancing between a long-run debt objective
and summary measure of output stabilization. More specifically, the rule proposes that
the targeted fiscal e↵ort (Et) positively depends on the sum of the primary gap (Pt)
and an aggregate score of macroeconomic conditions (St). The primary gap should
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then reflect the distance to a path of debt at a specified ’moderate’ level, whereas the
score is represents views about the business cycle.
The Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012) of the European Commission (ECFIN (2012))
has proposed a medium-term sustainability indicator (S1 indicator), to evaluate the
budgetary adjustment change required with a view of steadily improving the structural
primary balance by 2020 to bring debt ratios back to 60% of GDP. This 60% debt-
to-GDP ratio is the debt threshold implied by the Maastricht Treaty. This budgetary
e↵ort should then be kept constant until 2030, but should also include the financing of
any additional costs arising from an ageing population.
A Fiscal Stance scenario6
In this paper, we identify the required fiscal adjustment for each country by choosing
the middle ground from the approaches described above. Our analysis focuses on the
guidelines laid out by the European Commission’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
The SGP “is a set of rules designed to ensure that countries in the European Union pur-
sue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies.” (European Commission,
20157) In order to translate these rules into meaningful measures of fiscal adjustment,
and in particular, to quantify the changes in government expenditures in the model we
proceed in the following way:
First, we refer to the European Commission’s ’Flexibility Communication’ (ECFIN
(2015b)) and the associated ’fiscal adjustment matrix’, which specifies fiscal adjustment
requirements for countries in the EU, based on their performance along two dimensions:
their debt-to-GDP ratio (whether it is below, or above 60%), and their output gap
6This scenario is only illustrative and should not be seen as prejudging the ability, or willingness
of the European Commission, or countries to recommend, or implement fiscal adjustments.
7http://ec.europa.eu/economy finance/economic governance/sgp/index en.htm. Last accessed:
4/4/2015.
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(see Figure (2.4.1)). As can be seen, the matrix specifies larger fiscal adjustments
under good economic conditions (low debt-to-GDP; positive output gap) and smaller
fiscal adjustments during negative economic conditions (high debt-to-GDP; output gap
<  4). Notably, the purpose of these guidelines was to specify to member states under
the preventive arm of the SGP a straightforward way in achieving their medium-term
objectives (MTO).
Second, in order to assign to countries the recommended fiscal adjustment, we refer
to the European Economic Forecast: Winter 2015 (ECFIN (2015a)) and in particular
to the forecast of the expected fiscal stance in 2014 and 2015. Figure (2.4.2) plots the
average change in the structural balance in 2014 - 2015 against the debt-to-GDP ratio
(top panel) and the output gap (bottom panel) for countries in the EU. In this context,
it is straightforward to read from Figure (2.4.2) each country’s economic conditions and
assign them values of fiscal adjustment based on the matrix in Figure (2.4.1).
The final step is to take the di↵erence from the forecasted change in the structural
balance and the value assigned based on the flexibility matrix guidelines. The fore-
casted change in the structural balance can be seen directly from Figure (2.4.2), or the
country-specific sections in the European Economic Forecast: Winter 2015.
However, the flexibility matrix only provides guidelines to countries under the pre-
ventive arm of the SGP that have not yet achieved their MTOs (these include: BE,
EE, IT, LT, NL, AT, SK and FI), leaving two more categories of countries with an
unassigned fiscal adjustment value. The first of these is countries under the corrective
arm of the SGP (that is countries under the Excessive Deficit Procedure: MT, PT, SI,
FR, IE and ES). For these we make the assumption that their yearly fiscal adjustment
is equal to a fiscal consolidation of 0.5 percentage points of GDP. This assumption is
based on debt sustainability guidelines specified in ECFIN (2014). For countries that
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are at, or above their MTOs (based on our calculations, these include: DE, LV and
LU) we assume that they take progressive measures to come back to their MTOs. The
resulting values for fiscal adjustment can be see in Figure (2.4.3). Notably, Germany,
Italy, Latvia and Slovenia, which are all part of NOEA, undertake a fiscal expansion,
whereas all other countries undertake a fiscal consolidation.
2.3.3 Simulations
Given the calculation of the fiscal stance at the country level, we then aggregate
country-specific fiscal adjustments, weighted by their real GDP in 2015 to arrive at
an aggregate fiscal stance for NOEA and SOEA. The implied fiscal stance for NOEA
is 0.26% of GDP, whilst for SOEA it stands at -0.09% of GDP. We start the simula-
tion in 2015, and assume that the two adjustments for NOEA and SOEA take place
contemporaneously and last four quarters. Since one period in the model corresponds
to one quarter, we then average the results at a yearly frequency. Thus, all the results
from the simulations can be viewed as impulse response functions, whereby the fiscal
shock takes place in period 1, and is zero thereafter.
Moreover, as in Gali and Monacelli (2008) we assume that the only fiscal instrument,
which is a↵ected are government purchases. Thus, all other remaining fiscal instru-
ments (taxes on consumption, labor, corporate profits, lump-sum) remain constant at
their calibrated levels. Notably, throughout the simulations we assume that the RoW
model block remains unchanged. This is done to prevent confounding of the spillover
e↵ects from an adjustment within the EA. The purpose in incorporating such a RoW
block in the model is to therefore allow studying the transmission channels of fiscal
policy that operate through the nominal exchange rate (that is changes in the euro
vis-a-vis the foreign currency). Furthermore, the debt-target in the model is left un-
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changed, and the tax rule on labor income is switched o↵ until the year 2030, which
implies that any e↵ects on the endogenous variables of the model will not occur through
endogenous changes in the labor tax rate. Finally, given its large size, the model is
solved using deterministic simulations, and thus we implicitly assume that agents in
the environment have perfect foresight. This is not such a stringent assumption, since
the fiscal shock under consideration is only relevant on impact.
Below we present simulations in which monetary policy is not constrained by the zero
bound (i.e. an environment where the ZLB never binds). In Section (2.3.3), we relax
this assumption and compare the transmission of the fiscal shocks in an environment
where the ZLB is binding for twenty consecutive quarters following the fiscal shock.
The latter specification is arguably a more realistic representation of the current envi-
ronment in the Eurozone.
Domestic E↵ects and International Spillovers
Figure (2.4.4) plots the domestic e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation on SOEA, and
at the same time a NOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA. Due to the consolidation, the
South experiences a crowding out of private consumption and investment, but not
strong enough to revert the fall in GDP of approximately 0.05%. On the other hand,
the expansion in the North leads to opposite results leading to an increase in GDP by
approximately 0.2%. Figure (2.4.5) decomposes the total e↵ect on SOEA into domestic
e↵ects from the consolidation and into international spillovers arising from the NOEA
expansion. Figure (2.4.6) plots the respective e↵ects on NOEA. It is clear that when
the North and the South regions are expanding and consolidating respectively, the
spillover e↵ect coming from the North mitigate the e↵ects on the South’s real GDP,
which is consolidating. On the contrary, the total e↵ect on NOEA is still positive since
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the size of the expansion is in absolute terms greater than the consolidation in the
South, which is not large enough to o↵set the North’s fiscal expansion.
Gains from Fiscal Coordination
Figure (2.4.7) plots the domestic and spillover e↵ects on SOEA and NOEA, as well as
what these imply for the whole EA. Naturally, the e↵ects from the spillovers are smaller
than the domestic e↵ects of fiscal policy on real GDP. However, given the asymmetric
shock sizes and the larger relative size of NOEA, this leads to an increase in overall EA
GDP. Thus, there are gains from coordination, both from the perspective of the South
(where real GDP falls less on impact), but also from the perspective of the Euro area
as a whole (where real GDP increase by approximately 0.9% on impact).
Active Monetary Policy vs a Zero-Lower Bound
Figures (2.4.8), (2.4.9) contrast the total e↵ects on NOEA and SOEA under active
monetary policy or when the zero bound constraint is assumed to be binding for 5
years.
First, we observe that under a ZLB on nominal interest rates the South benefits from
the expansion in the North. That is, the expansion in the North overcompensates for
the fiscal consolidation in the South. This is because under a ZLB the spillovers from
the North are positive and more sizable. The transmission mechanism for this result
can be attributed to three channels:
Income e↵ect: The increase in government purchases in the North leads to a rise in the
quantity of net exports in the South (imports of the North). Since North imports and
domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes this leads to a rise in economic
activity in the South.
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Internal competitiveness e↵ect: The increase in government purchases in the North
leads to a rise in the price of exports in the South (imports of the North) and an increase
in South competitiveness relative to the North (due to the increase in inflation of the
North).
External competitiveness (exchange rate) e↵ect: The Euro area exchange rate
depreciates with respect to the rest of the world generating an increase in competitive-
ness and hence an increase in domestic demand in the North. This happens because
when the nominal interest rate is kept constant at zero, fiscal policy actions lead to
an overall increase in Euro inflation causing the real interest rate to drop. This then
implies that there is an outflow of capital causing a depreciation of the exchange rate.
Interestingly, the ZLB acts as a monetary policy expansion when accompanied by an
aggregate fiscal expansion.
In the baseline case, where the nominal interest rate was free to respond to changes
in inflation and the output gap there was an additional e↵ect, which overturned the
result on South GDP on impact.
Interest rate e↵ect: Due to the North’s expansion (which has a high share in Euro-
area GDP) the nominal interest rate increases leading to an increase in the real interest
rate. This is because prices in the North are increasing (due to the positive demand
e↵ect and positive internal competitiveness e↵ect) leading to higher inflation. As a
result, the Euro appreciates leading to a loss in competitiveness.
Furthermore, the interest rate channel also operates to a↵ect domestic demand. Since
the real interest rate is increasing this implies a reduction in investment and the con-
sumption of Ricardian households.
Finally, Figure (2.4.10) plots the total e↵ects on the EA under a ZLB and under active
monetary policy. From the discussion above, it follows that under a ZLB the e↵ects
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on EA real GDP on impact become more positive. Thus, under the current juncture
in the Eurozone, the gains from fiscal coordination are even greater.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper has constructed a model along the lines of Ratto et al. (2009) and Vogel
(2014), which allows to study strategies of fiscal coordination across regions of the
Eurozone. The paper contributes to the current debate on the merits of fiscal coordi-
nation, by o↵ering a theoretical understanding of fiscal adjustments in the North and
South Eurozone under two di↵erent monetary policy arrangements.
The model is particularly suitable in investigating this question as it consists of a
two-region world, with several features that have been identified in the literature as
important in replicating empirical stylized facts in quantitative macroeconomics: nom-
inal frictions in prices and wages, a distinction of households into liquidity-constrained
and optimizing, an expanded fiscal sector with a role for productive government invest-
ment, and a Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule for monetary policy. The model is
then calibrated to the EU South and EU North and fed with a particular fiscal policy
scenario where the EU North undertakes a fiscal expansion, and the EU South un-
dertakes a fiscal consolidation. This scenario has been constructed by collecting data
from the European Commission’s Winter Forecast 2015 and the guidelines on fiscal
adjustment laid out by the Stability and Growth Pact.
The results suggest that when monetary policy is constrained by the zero-lower bound
the EA South benefits from the expansion in the EA North, although it is in itself
undertaking a fiscal consolidation. This occurs when monetary policy is constrained
under the ZLB, as in this setting the spillovers from the North’s expansion are larger.
Empirical evidence in the fiscal policy literature confirms the importance of fiscal shock
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spillovers. The key di↵erence between a ZLB and an active monetary arrangement, is
the presence of an interest rate e↵ect, which is under operation only in the latter case.
Under an active monetary policy the North’s expansion triggers a nominal interest
rate increase leading to an increase in the real interest rate. As a result, the Euro
appreciates leading to a loss in competitiveness. In contrast, under a ZLB, fiscal policy
actions imply an overall increase in Euro inflation causing the real interest rate to drop.
This then results in an outflow of capital from the EA causing a depreciation of the
exchange rate, and hence a loss in output.
The results in the paper are of particular relevance for policymakers in the US and
the Eurozone in the current environment of a slow recovery from the Great Recession.
An important next step on the policy front would thus be to design programs and
institutions that can implement and accommodate this coordination.
Potential extensions to this paper could include a more accurate regional di↵erentiation
in the model, with a distinctive calibration across a greater number of dimensions
(e.g. steady shares of consumption-to-GDP, investment-to-GDP, etc). Furthermore,
although the paper has emphasized a particular policy scenario, it would be interesting
to expand the availability of policy instruments responsible for the fiscal adjustment
(consumption taxes, income taxes, corporate taxes, government investment). A welfare
analysis would then become appropriate, and lead to further insight. Finally, it would
also be relevant to study the timing of the fiscal adjustment (e.g. frontloaded vs.
backloaded), and in this way be able to contribute to the debate on the e cacy of
growth-friendly fiscal consolidations.
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Figure 2.4.1: Fiscal Adjustment Matrix
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ANNEX 2 - MATRIX FOR SPECIFYING THE ANNUAL FISCAL ADJUSTMENT  
TOWARDS THE MEDIUM-TERM OBJECTIVE (MTO)  
UNDER THE PREVENTIVE ARM OF THE PACT 
 
  Required annual fiscal adjustment* 
 Condition Debt below 60 % and  no sustainability risk 
Debt above 60 % or 
sustainability risk 
Exceptionally 
bad times 
Real growth <0  
or output gap <-4 
No adjustment needed 
Very bad 
times 
-4  output  
gap <-3 
0 0.25 
Bad times -3  output  gap < -1.5 
0 if growth below 
potential, 0.25 if growth 
above potential 
0.25 if growth below 
potential, 0.5 if growth 
above potential 
Normal times -1.5  output  gap < 1.5 0.5 > 0.5 
Good times output gap   1.5 % 
> 0.5 if growth below 
potential,  0.75 if 
growth above potential 
 0.75 if growth below 
potential,  1 if  
growth above potential 
* all figures are in percentage points of GDP 
Definitions: 
 Fiscal adjustment: improvement in the general government fiscal balance measured  
in structural terms (i.e. cyclically adjusted and without one-off measures). 
 Growth potential: estimated rate of growth if the economy is at its potential output. 
 Output gap: difference between the level of actual and potential output (expressed  
in percentage points compared to the potential output).  
 Potential output: a summary indicator of the economy's capacity to generate sustainable,  
non-inflationary output. 
Explanations: 
The matrix ensures that Member States can adapt their fiscal adjustments over the economic cycle 
while taking into account their fiscal consolidation needs.  
 
The larger the positive (negative) output gap, the greater (lower) the required adjustment effort.  
The matrix takes into account the direction into which the economy is moving, i.e. whether the 
economic situation is improving or deteriorating, by distinguishing whether the real GDP exceeds or 
falls short of a country-specific potential growth rate.  
Source: European Commission, Communication: Making the Best Use of the Flexibility within the Existing Rules of
the Stability and Growth Pact. Strasbourg, 13/1/2015, page 20, Annex 2.
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Figure 2.4.2: Fiscal Gaps for EA
European Economic Forecast, Winter 2015 
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The difference between both areas is due to a 
sizeable deterioration in the structural balance in 
some Member States outside the euro area, in 
particular Bulgaria, Hungary, Sweden, the Czech 
Republic and the United Kingdom. In 2015, the 
structural deficit is projected to remain roughly 
stable in both the EU and the euro area. 
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Graph I.39: Budgetary developments, EU
 
 
Notwithstanding the envisaged broadly neutral 
fiscal stance expected in 2014 and 2015, there are 
important differences among countries. On 
average, thirteen EU Member States are set to 
improve their structural balances in these two 
years (Graph I.40). For the vast majority of these 
countries, this fiscal effort is expected to be lower 
than 0.5% of GDP, with Ireland delivering the 
highest average change in the structural balance 
(0.7% of GDP) over 2014-15. In turn, the 
remaining fifteen EU Member States are on 
average expected to loosen their fiscal policies 
over 2014-15 with a considerable loosening of 
more than an average of 0.5% of GDP in five 
Member States (Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Bulgaria and Hungary). 
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Graph I.40: Fiscal stance in the EU in 2014-2015 – structural balance 
vs. debt ratio and output gap
Decrease in both government expenditure and 
tax revenue to GDP ratios… 
As regards the composition of public finances, 
while fiscal consolidation was largely revenue-
based in 2013, lower government expenditure is 
 
 
(% of GDP)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 2013 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016
Total receipts (1) 46.5 46.6 46.6 46.4 46.7 46.7 46.4 45.4 45.2 45.0 44.8 45.2 45.0 44.8
Total expenditure (2) 49.4 49.2 48.8 48.3 49.3 49.0 48.5 48.6 48.1 47.6 47.0 48.2 47.8 47.1
Actual balance (3) = (1)-(2) -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.9 -2.6 -2.4 -2.1 -3.2 -3.0 -2.6 -2.2 -3.0 -2.7 -2.3
Interest expenditure (4) 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5
Primary balance (5) = (3)+(4) -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 -0.2 0.2
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance -1.2 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.7 -1.6 -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Cyclically-adjusted primary balance 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7
Structural budget balance -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.3 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -1.8 -1.8
Change in structural budget balance 0.9 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Gross debt 93.1 94.3 94.4 93.2 94.5 94.8 93.8 87.1 88.4 88.3 87.6 88.1 88.3 87.6
Table I.8:
forecastEuro area
General Government budgetary position - euro area and EU
The structural budget balance is the cyclically-adjusted budget balance net of one-off and other temporary measures estimated
by the European Commission
EU
Autumn 2014
forecast
Autumn 2014
 
 
Source: European Commission, European Economic Forecast: Winter 2015, page 42, graph I.40
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Figure 2.4.3: Fiscal Gaps for EA
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Blue bars denote the forecasted change in the structural balance (as a % of GDP) in 2014-2015. Red bars denote the
fiscal stance scenario implied by the ’Flexibility matrix’. Solid blue line denotes the di↵erence in the forecasted change in
the structural balance and the fiscal stance scenario. The source for the blue bars is: European Commission, European
Economic Forecast: Winter 2015
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Figure 2.4.4: Domestic E↵ects on SOEA and NOEA
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case of active monetary policy. The variables plotted are: GDP, private
consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the
current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and government purchases (as a % of GDP).
Solid red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation on SOEA. Dashed black lines correspond to the
e↵ects of a NOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA.
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Figure 2.4.5: Domestic E↵ects and International Spillovers on SOEA
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case of active monetary policy. The variables plotted are: GDP, private
consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the
current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and government purchases (as a % of GDP).
Dashed red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation on SOEA. Dashed black lines correspond
to the e↵ects of a NOEA fiscal expansion on SOEA. Solid blue lines correspond to the GDP-weighted total e↵ects on
SOEA.
104
Figure 2.4.6: Domestic E↵ects and International Spillovers on NOEA
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case of active monetary policy. The variables plotted are: GDP, private
consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the
current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and government purchases (as a % of GDP).
Dashed red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation on NOEA. Dashed black lines correspond
to the e↵ects of a NOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA. Solid blue lines correspond to the GDP-weighted total e↵ects on
NOEA.
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Figure 2.4.7: Fiscal Coordination
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The IRFs are presented for the baseline case of active monetary policy. The variables plotted are: GDP, private
consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the
current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and government purchases (as a % of GDP).
Dashed red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation on NOEA. Dashed red lines correspond to
the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation and a NOEA fiscal expansion on SOEA. Dashed black lines correspond to
the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation and a NOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA. Solid green lines correspond to the
e↵ects of a GDP-weighted SOEA fiscal consolidation and a GDP weighted NOEA fiscal expansion on EA.
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Figure 2.4.8: Fiscal Coordination in SOEA under Active Monetary Policy vs a Zero Lower
Bound
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The variables plotted are: GDP, private consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest
rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and
government purchases (as a % of GDP). Solid red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation and a
NOEA fiscal expansion on SOEA under active monetary policy. Solid blue lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA
fiscal consolidation and a NOEA fiscal expansion on SOEA under a zero lower bound.
107
Figure 2.4.9: Fiscal Coordination in NOEA under Active Monetary Policy vs a Zero Lower
Bound
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The variables plotted are: GDP, private consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest
rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and
government purchases (as a % of GDP). Solid red lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA fiscal consolidation and a
NOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA under active monetary policy. Solid blue lines correspond to the e↵ects of a SOEA
fiscal consolidation and aNOEA fiscal expansion on NOEA under a zero lower bound.
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Figure 2.4.10: Fiscal Coordination in EA under Active Monetary Policy vs a Zero Lower
Bound
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The variables plotted are: GDP, private consumption, private investment, public debt (as a % of GDP), the real interest
rate, inflation (as a % of GDP), the current account (as a % of GDP), net exports, the nominal exchange rate and
government purchases (as a % of GDP). Solid green lines correspond to the e↵ects of a GDP-weighted SOEA fiscal
consolidation and a GDP weighted NOEA fiscal expansion on EA under active monetary policy. Dashed blue lines
correspond to the e↵ects of a GDP-weighted SOEA fiscal consolidation and a GDP weighted NOEA fiscal expansion on
EA under a zero lower bound.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy under Labor Market
and Financial Frictions
3.1 Introduction
Since the onset of the Great Recession in 2007 many European economies are facing
problems of growing government debt and unemployment. This is occurring against the
backdrop of deleveraging pressures to households caused by a combination of restricted
access to credit from the financial sector and subdued growth. Given these concerns
many countries have responded by undertaking massive fiscal consolidation measures,
a process labelled as an internal devaluation in the Eurozone periphery. However, these
measures largely seem to be failing and emphasis has been placed on the inability of
Eurozone members to pursue an independent monetary policy in order to tackle the
distortions. The ine cacy of austerity measures has recently launched a debate on the
e↵ectiveness of fiscal instruments to o↵set the distortions amplified by the crisis with
the European Economic Recovery Plan in particular giving rise to a new academic
and policy literature on the economic e↵ects of fiscal devaluations. The views on the
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e↵ectiveness of fiscal consolidations do not generally reach a consensus, but a typical
argument suggests that the e↵ects of government spending on output are smaller when
a country is constrained by a currency peg, as in the European Monetary Union,
as potential nominal interest rate decreases and currency depreciations are no longer
available instruments to dampen the negative impacts on aggregate demand.
As can be seen in the left panel of Figure (3.1.1) the unemployment rate in Europe’s
periphery surged following the onset of the crisis in the final quarter of 2007 reach-
ing approximately 18%. One plausible feature that has been put forth to cause this
disequilibrium in the labor market is downward nominal rigidity of wages. This regu-
larity has been empirically documented in several studies (e.g. Knoppik and Beissinger
(2001); Dickens et al. (2006); Babecky et al. (2010); Benigno and Ricci (2011); Kim
and Ruge-Murcia (2011)) and as can be seen in Figure (3.1.2), nominal wages for most
of the high-unemployment countries in the sample display this feature.1 At the same
time as this increase in unemployment, the private sector’s access to credit has become
ever more restricted and the first quarter of 2008 found households in Eurozone’s pe-
riphery to be forced into a mild deleveraging by cutting down on their net borrowing.
However, as observed both in Figure (3.1.1) as well as documented in several empirical
studies (Justiniano et al. (2013); Cuerpo et al. (2013); Buttiglione et al. (2014)), the
speed of household deleveraging in Europe is still slow. Arguably, the continued high
unemployment rates and the slow movement of the net lending-to-net borrowing ratio
is acting as a burden on economic recovery from the crisis. Moreover, they empirically
appear to be occurring simultaneously.
This paper investigates the e↵ects of fiscal policy in an environment, which captures the
salient features that have become relevant to hindering the process of recovery from a
1The exceptions are Greece and Portugal from 2010 onwards, but on average the labor cost index
across the whole EU periphery is increasing.
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Figure 3.1.1: Distortions in the Eurozone Periphery
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Mean of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Sample period: 2000-2012. Shaded area corresponds to Great
Recession (2008 to 2009). Unemployment is plotted on the left axis. Household debt-to-GDP is plotted on the right
axis. Sources: World Bank, Eurostat
Figure 3.1.2: Nominal Labor Cost Index
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The nominal unit labour cost is defined as the ratio of total compensation of employees, in millions of national currency
per total number of employees in persons divided by the ratio of GDP in market prices in millions, chain-linked volumes,
reference year 2005 (CLV05), at 2005 exchange rates in national currency per total number of persons employed in
persons. Source: Eurostat
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financial crisis in a currency union - labor market and financial frictions in an economy
operating under a fixed exchange rate regime. The paper proposes a mechanism where
“crisis shocks” to the financial sector of the model gives rise to the two distortions
jointly, by spilling over from the financial side of the model into the labor market. The
frictions responsible in generating these distortions are modeled as downward nominal
rigid wages and a collateral constraint on private sector borrowing. Following the bust,
which triggers a financial crisis leads to a tightening of household borrowing constraints
and an increase in unemployment. These two distortions arise jointly and interact to
replicate the stylized fact observed in Figure (3.1.1).
The class of models where unemployment manifests itself in disequilibrium caused by
asymmetric wage rigidity is due to Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2011, 2012, 2013). In
contrast to the standard New Keynesian models of nominal wage rigidity where em-
ployment is always demand determined, in this setting employment remains demand
determined during contractions, but supply and demand determined during booms. As
a result, unemployment arises during contractions, but full employment is reached dur-
ing booms. The important features that causes real wages to become downwardly rigid
is the combination of nominal wage rigidity (document empirically in Figure (3.1.2))
and a fixed exchange rate - a currency peg as in the Eurozone. During a contraction,
wages cannot adjust downwards because of their rigidity, requiring a nominal exchange
rate depreciation to bring about their indirect deflation. If this instrument is not avail-
able due to an economy’s pegging of its currency then unemployment arises. We view
this approach as a natural way to motivate the increase in unemployment in a recession.
Furthermore, it provides an interesting platform to analyze the joint determination of
debt and unemployment in the model.
The first contribution of this paper is to enrich the framework where unemployment
manifests itself in disequilibrium by incorporating a financial friction found in the works
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of Mendoza (2010); Bianchi (2011) and Benigno et al. (2012) among others. It then
proposes a mechanism for the propagation of crisis shocks in the economy. This friction
takes the form of an occasionally binding collateral constraint that is introduced on
the side of the private sector whereby the volume of debt issued is limited by the value
of collateral leveraged on tradable and non-tradable income. As a result, changes in
the value of collateral will a↵ect the tightness of the constraint and hence the ability
of the private sector to borrow.
There are several recent attempts to synthesize these distortions. Other papers, which
consider the combination of these two distortions in variably di↵erent settings include
Fornaro (2012); Ottonello (2014) and Zhu (2014). The focus of their work however is on
debt relief policies , optimal exchange rate policy, and optimal capital flow management
and respectively.
The second objective of this paper is to study the response of fiscal policy in this
distortive environment and investigate whether a fiscal consolidation, or expansion
is preferable in mitigating, or o↵setting these ine ciencies. The results suggests that
active fiscal policy cannot tackle both of these issues simultaneously, thereby generating
an ’debt-unemployment’ trade-o↵. Following a fiscal consolidation through cuts in
government consumption the private sector is induced into a deleveraging, however
at a cost of rising unemployment. In contrast, following a fiscal expansion through
expenditure increases, labor demand increases to o↵set unemployment, but at the
same time leads to a relaxation of borrowing constraints resulting in higher private
debt. The results suggest that in order to understand the appropriate policy targeted
at o↵setting the distortions amplified by the crisis requires a richer modeling of the
fiscal sector, with more explicit roles for the fiscal instruments than the ones commonly
found in previous studies. In this paper we allow for fiscal policy to transmit its e↵ects
through changes in government consumption, investment and a capital control tax on
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Figure 3.1.3: Real E↵ective Exchange Rate
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Recession (12-2007 to 06-2009). Source: BIS
private debt.
The key element that a↵ects the extent of deleveraging and unemployment following
changes in fiscal policy is the movement of the real exchange rate, an issue, which is
still debated in the empirical literature.
Several studies find that following positive government spending shocks the real ex-
change rate appreciates (Erceg et al. (2008); Galstyan and Lane (2009); Beetsma and
Giuliodori (2011)), whereas other work finds the contrasting e↵ect, namely that a pos-
itive government spending shock leads to a real exchange rate depreciation (Monacelli
and Perotti (2010); Ravn et al. (2012)). This apparent inconsistency can be conjec-
tured to stem from the di↵erent methodological approaches and samples in question
among other factors that distinguish the relevant papers. As can be seen in Figure
(3.1.3) the real e↵ective exchange rate followed a downward trend since the onset of
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the crisis in 2007, a period, which was marked by large-scale fiscal consolidations in
most of the European periphery. This could imply a positive correlation between gov-
ernment spending shocks and real exchange rate depreciations, but further empirical
work is needed to fully disentangle this relationship.
On the policy front, the model sheds light on the debate of the merits and disadvantages
of fiscal consolidations that have become so commonly implemented in countries like
Greece, Portugal and Spain. The fact that fiscal policy is rendered toothless in the
presence of high unemployment and private sector debt, also sets a pessimist tone on
the optimality of the monetary union, whereby monetary policy at the national level
is absent.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section (3.2) describes the model
environment by synthesizing the work on labor market and financial frictions. Section
(3.3) in turn proposes a mechanism for the propagation of a financial shock through
the economy and performs a quantitative analysis of the model to analyze the e↵ects
of fiscal policy in this setting. Finally, section (3.4) concludes.
3.2 Model
The purpose of this section is to describe the main elements of the model, and in
particular how the di↵erent crisis shocks endogenously generate distortions in labor
and financial markets. As such, in what follows we abstract from a fiscal policy block,
and only introduce this in Section (3.3.3).
The model features a small open economy populated by a representative household that
consumes an aggregate basket (Ct) of tradable goods
 
cTt
 
and non-tradable goods 
cNt
 
. The tradable good is endowed, whereas the non-tradable good is produced
using labor (Nt). Labor is ineslatically supplied by workers to firms operating in a
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perfectly competitive non-tradable goods market in return for a real wage (wt). The
nominal wage (Wt) however is assumed to be downwardly rigid. The household can also
borrow/lend from international credit markets by selling/purchasing one-period non-
contingent debt (dt) subject to an endogenous limit, which links the volume of debt to
the value of collateralizable income from both the tradable and the non-tradable sectors.
The real interest rate (Rt) on debt is exogenously given and stochastic. Aggregate
fluctuations in the economy are driven by stochastic movements in the value of the
tradable good (yt) , the real interest rate (Rt) and in the tightness of the collateral
constraint.
3.2.1 Households
Households have preferences over a consumption basket (Ct), which comprises of trad-
able consumption
 
cTt
 
and non-tradable consumption
 
cNt
 
. Preferences of the repre-
sentative household are given by the period utility function
E0
1X
t=0
 t
C1  t   1
1    (3.2.1)
where E0 denotes the expectations operator conditional upon information known at
time t. The parameters 0 <   < 1 and   denote the subjective discount factor and the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption respectively.
Tradable cTt and non-tradable consumption c
N
t is aggregated using the CES function
Ct = A
 
cTt , c
N
t
 
=

⌘
 
cTt
 
+ (1  ⌘)  cNt   ⇣ 1⇣   ⇣⇣ 1 (3.2.2)
where the parameter ⇣ measures the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between
the two consumption goods, and ⌘ denotes the relative weight of the tradable con-
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sumption good in the basket. Consequently, the aggregate price index is given by
Pt =
h
⌘⇣P T
1 ⇣
t + (1  ⌘)⇣ PN1 ⇣t
i 1
1 ⇣
(3.2.3)
In each period, the representative household is endowed with yTt units of the tradable
good and one unit of labor. It inelastically supplies labor Nt to the labor market in
return for the real wage wt. Furthermore, it also has the possibility to borrow from
financial markets in the form of a one-period non-state-contingent bond by assuming
debt dt denominated in tradable goods. Notably, if dt > 0 the household is a net
borrower. Debt faces a household-specific real interest rate Rt, which is exogenously
determined. The budget constraint is denominated in units of the tradable good and
is given by
cTt + ptc
N
t + dt = dt 1Rt 1 + y
T
t + wtNt + ⇧
N
t (3.2.4)
where expenditures consist of real consumption of tradable goods
 
cTt
 
, real consump-
tion of non-tradable goods
 
cNt
 
and real debt dt. Revenues of the household include
real wage income wtNt, the endowment of the tradable good yTt , the real return on debt
dt 1Rt 1, as well as real profits from ownership of the nontradable firms ⇧Nt . pt ⌘ P
N
t
PTt
corresponds to the price of nontradable goods in terms of tradables, and is labelled as
the real exchange rate.
Debt issued by the household is subject to an endogenous collateral constraint, which
binds in some periods but not all. This is the specification of the financial friction
in the model. The constraint depends on current profits and wage income, both in-
fluenced by the stochastic realizations in the economy and the wage rigidity imposed.
Although debt is denominated in units of tradables, the collateral side consists of in-
come from both the tradable and nontradable sectors, thus capturing the e↵ects of
liability dollarization. We assume that it is imposed from the side of external lenders
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and the motivation for its structure rests on the assumption that debt repayment can-
not be perfectly enforced. Households may decide to not honor their debt repayments
in every period, in which case with a stochastic time-varying probability t the collat-
eralized assets would be seized and liquidated by lenders. Variation in this probability
corresponds to a financial shock in the model, inducing a tightening of the borrow-
ing constraint.2 This specification of the collateral constraint was first introduced by
Mendoza (2002), to study the e↵ects of currency mismatch on external credit-market
access. Notably, the constraint generates a pecuniary externality, which arises from the
fact that individual agents fail to internalize the aggregate impact of their borrowing
decisions on the relative price of non-tradable goods. This in turn a↵ects the value of
collateral. Its form is given by
dt  t
 
yTt + wtNt + ⇧
N
t
 
(3.2.5)
To close the model and determine private debt we follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2012) and specify an exogenously given real interest rate, which we assume it follows
an AR(1) process
Rt = ⇢rRt 1 + "rt (3.2.6)
Note that an alternative specification of the interest rate could allow it to be elastic in
the volume of debt that the household assumes. Shocks to real interest rate represent
a sudden increase in risk premia from the perspective of households, thus incentivizing
a deleveraging.
In turn, the endowment of the tradable good yTt is assumed to be stochastic and follow
2For further details on the renegotiation process from which the borrowing constraint arises see:
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), or Korinek (2011) among others.
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the AR(1) process
yTt = ⇢yy
T
t 1 + "
y
t (3.2.7)
Variations to the tradable endowment yTt correspond to shocks to the terms of trade
, or in an alternative interpretation, to productivity. Notably, introducing a tradable
sector in production, where households provide labor to tradable firms in return for
wage income and profits would be an equivalent specification. Shocks to the tradable
sector’s productivity could then drive aggregate fluctuations.
Finally, a no-Ponzi game condition is also imposed
dt  d¯ (3.2.8)
and following Aiyagari (1994) specified as a natural debt limit d¯ = R¯
R¯ 1y
T , where yT
corresponds to the lowest possible realization of the tradable endowment shock, and
R¯ to the highest possible realization of the interest rate shock. The limit determines
the maximum amount of debt the household can repay almost surely for any shock
realization and assuming that it never consumes any tradable goods (cTt = 0, for all t).
Household First Order Conditions
Households choose state-contingent plans
 
cTt , c
N
t , dt
 
to maximize (3.2.1) subject to
(3.2.2), (3.2.4), (3.2.5), and (3.2.8). If  t, µt and ⌘t are the Lagrange multipliers on
equations (3.2.4), (3.2.5) and (3.2.8) respectively then the optimality conditions are
given by
cTt : ⌘ (Ct)
   ⇣ 1  cTt    1⇣ =  t (3.2.9)
cNt : (1  ⌘) (Ct) 
 
⇣ 1
 
cNt
   1⇣ = pt t (3.2.10)
dt :  t =  Et t+1Rt + µt + ⌘t (3.2.11)
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along with the complementary slackness conditions
µt
 
t
 
yTt + wtNt + ⇧
N
t
   dt  = 0 (3.2.12)
⌘t
 
d¯  dt
 
= 0 (3.2.13)
Three remarks are in order. First, note that by substituting equation (3.2.9) inside
(3.2.10) we can derive the relative consumption of nontradable goods to tradable goods
pt =
✓
1  ⌘
⌘
◆✓
cNt
cTt
◆ 1
⇣
, which can also be interpreted as the demand schedule for nontradables. Second,
recall that labor is inelastically supplied and hence no optimization over labor supply
is undertaken by the household. As will be shown further below, labor is exogenously
determined in the model and implied by the pricing equation for wages. Because of
the presence of downwardly rigid nominal wages the labor market will in general not
clear (during contractions) and instead involuntary unemployment equal to n¯ Nt will
arise. Further explanations are provided in the description of the labor market below.
Third, note that if   = 1⇣ then utility becomes additively separable in the consumption
of tradables and nontradables. Thus, the marginal utility of one type of consumption
does not depend on the marginal utility of the other, implying that the activity in the
non-tradable sector does not a↵ect the activity in the tradable sector.
3.2.2 Firms
Nontradable goods in the economy are produced by firms using hired labor from house-
holds
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Y Nt = F (Nt) =  N
⇠
t (3.2.14)
Nontradable production is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of labor,
in order to capture diminishing marginal returns, where ⇠,   > 0. The parameter  
helps prevent negative realizations of nontradable consumption cNt when government
spending is introduced in the model (and assumed to consume a share of the non-
tradable consumption good).
Profits of the firm are in turn given by
⇧Nt = ptY
N
t   wtNt (3.2.15)
Firm First Order Conditions
Firms produce Y Nt by choosing Nt to maximize (3.2.15) given prices pt and wt
wt =  ⇠ptN
⇠ 1
t (3.2.16)
leading to the determination of the real wage. Re-arranging equation (3.2.16) leads to
pt =
wt
⇠N ⇠ 1t
which corresponds to the supply schedule of nontradables.
3.2.3 Labor Market
An important feature of the model is the assumption of downwardly nominal rigid
wages. We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) and assume that the present nominal
wage Wt has to be a fraction   greater than nominal wage in the previous period Wt 1.
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Wt    Wt 1 (3.2.17)
For     1 current wages are absolutely downwardly rigid, and for   = 0 they are
perfectly flexible. In turn, for values of 0 <   < 1 then the current wage adjusts
sluggishly at the rate (1   ). Assuming the law of one price holds for tradables,
P Tt = P
T⇤
t Et where Et is the nominal exchange rate and letting P
T⇤
t = 1 we can write
the real wage in terms of tradables as
wt =
Wt
Et
and by substituting into equation (3.2.17) we obtain
wt    wt 1
✏t
Here, ✏t ⌘ EtEt 1 defines the gross devaluation rate of the nominal exchange rate and
is exogenously given. We retain the assumption that the economy described is part
of a currency union and has no independent exchange rate authority. This implies
that the gross devaluation rate is constant and hence ✏t = 1. The latter result can
be understood as a currency peg. interstingly, the combination of the two nominal
rigidities (downwardly nominal rigid wages and a constant devaluation rate) gives rise
to real wages becoming donwardly rigid.
Furthermore, in order to guarantee uniqueness of the equilibrium we impose the fol-
lowing constraint on hours worked
Nt  n¯
, which states that labor (inelastically) supplied to the market Nt may not exceed an
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exogenously given limit. n¯ can be viewed as the maximum number of hours worked
and is set in the calibration to be equal to the full employment level (n¯ = 1). The
constraint on hours also implies that demand for labor cannot exceed supply in the labor
market. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, the constraint becomes necessary
as without it an infinite number of solutions can arise when the wage constraint (3.2.17)
is non-binding.
Finally, the combination of the constraint on hours with downwardly nominal real
wages implies that at any point in time wages and labor demanded must satisfy the
following slackness condition
(n¯ Nt)
✓
wt    wt 1
✏t
◆
= 0 (3.2.18)
The condition states that periods where the wage constraint is binding, must be ac-
companied by unemployment (nt < n¯). Typically, as will be explained below this will
occur during recessions, whereby the real wage cannot fall to clear the labor market.
In contrast, when the wage constraint is not binding, the economy must be in full
employment (n¯ = Nt).
3.2.4 Market Clearing
Market clearing for the nontradable sector is given by
F (Nt) = y
N
t = c
N
t (3.2.19)
Finally, the current account (CAt) is obtained by substituting firms’ profits (3.2.15)
and the market clearing condition for nontradables (3.2.19) into the household’s budget
constraint (3.2.4)
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CAt ⌘ yTt   cTt   dt + dt 1Rt 1 (3.2.20)
3.2.5 General Equilibrium
Here we provide a definition for the general equilibrium of the economy. Given an
exchange rate policy ✏t = 1, initial values for the exogenous states sx0 = (y0, E0,0) and
endogenous states se0 = (d0, w 1), equations (3.2.2), (3.2.4), (3.2.9), (3.2.10), (3.2.11),
(3.2.12), (3.2.13), (3.2.14), (3.2.15), (3.2.16), (3.2.18), and (3.2.19) comprise an equi-
librium in the variables: 
Ct, cTt , c
N
t , pt, dt, Nt, y
N
t , wt,⇧
N
t , , t, µt, ⌘t
 
(3.2.2) : C = A
 
cTt , c
N
t
 
=
h
↵
 
cTt
  ⇣ 1
⇣ + (1  ↵)  cNt   ⇣ 1⇣ i ⇣⇣ 1
(3.2.4) : cTt + ptc
N
t + dt = dt 1Rt 1 + y
T
t + wtNt + ⇧
N
t
(3.2.9) : ⌘ (Ct)
   ⇣ 1  cTt    1⇣ =  t
(3.2.10) : (1  ⌘) (Ct) 
 
⇣ 1
 
cNt
   1⇣ = pt t
(3.2.11) :  t =   (Rt)Et t+1 + µt + ⌘t
(3.2.12) : µt
 
t
 
yTt + wtNt + ⇧
N
t
   dt  = 0
(3.2.13) : ⌘t
 
d¯  dt
 
= 0
(3.2.14) : Y Nt =  N
⇠
t
(3.2.15) : ⇧Nt = ptY
N
t   wtNt
(3.2.16) : wt =  ⇠ptN
⇠ 1
t
(3.2.18) : (n¯ Nt)
⇣
wt     wt 1✏t
⌘
= 0
(3.2.19) : Y Nt = c
N
t
126
3.3. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section undertakes a quantitative analysis of the model in order to illustrate the
basic mechanisms. It does so by studying the response of the economy to external
shocks that mimic the e↵ects of the financial crisis of 2008 in the Eurozone periphery.
As such we proceed by simulating three scenarios. The first consists of a negative
shock to the tradable endowment yTt . This case can be interpreted as a collapse in
the domestic production of tradable goods, or a shock to the terms of trade, arising
from external factors. The second case consists of a positive shock to the real interest
rate faced by households Rt. The increase in the real interest rate can be viewed as
an increase in risk premia, resulting in reduced international capital mobility. The
third scenario consists of a shock to the collateral constraint of households and the
borrowing limit t, inducing a tightening of borrowing constraints. This has been
frequently referred to as a financial shock in the financial frictions literature (see e.g.
Jermann and Quadrini, 2012).
3.3.1 Parameterisation and Numerical Solution
The parameters for the quantitative analysis can be seen in Table (3.1). They have
been illustratively set to standard values in the literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2012)), who calibrate a similar environment to Argentina. The shock processes
are also assumed to share a common parameterisation.
Since the model features two sources of nonlinearities, namely the endogenously bind-
ing collateral constraint and asymmetric wage rigidity, a linear analytical closed-form
solution cannot be obtained. We proceed to numerically solve the model using the
piecewise linear algorithm proposed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). Applied to the
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Label Value
  Risk aversion 2
⇣ Intratemporal elasticity of substitution between T and NT 0.45
⌘ Share of Tradables 0.3
  Discount factor 0.945
⇠ Labor share in NT sector 0.75
  Degree of wage rigidity 0.997
n¯ Labor endowment 1
Shock processes
⇢y, ⇢r, ⇢k Autocorrelation coe cients 0.9
 y,  r,  k Standard deviation 0.05
current setting, the main novelty behind this solution method invokes the fact that
the model can be characterized by at most four regimes: two where the collateral
constraint is binding and the wage constraint is binding or slack, and another two
where the collateral constraint is slack and the wage constraint is binding or slack.
In the (non-stochastic) steady-state the collateral constraint is binding, but the wage
constraint is slack guaranteeing full employment. In this way, the model can accom-
modate values of the wage rigidity parameter  , which are di↵erent from 1. Whenever
a shock hits the economy leading the collateral constraint to become slack (or the wage
constraint to bind), then there is a regime shift. However, in the long run, the solution
is expected to revert to the (non-stochastic) steady state regime. Moreover, within a
given regime the solution is linear, which gives rise to in total four di↵erent linear pol-
icy rules, one for each regime. Within a given regime, policy rules are computed using
a first-order approximation. Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) show that this approach
compares accurately to a global solution method such as value function iteration, and
saves on computational time.
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Figure 3.3.1: Dynamics of a Crisis
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3.3.2 Di↵erent Sources of a Crisis
To characterize the behavior of the model under the three crisis environments, for
each type of shock we simulate a path, which generates a mild boom followed by an
extraordinary contraction in total output. In each scenario, the source for the boom
and eventual bust in output will be di↵erent. More specifically, we define this cycle as a
situation where either three of the following cases hold: i) tradable output is increasing
by one standard deviation for two periods, and then contracts sharply by one standard
deviation for four periods, ii) the real interest rate decreases by one standard deviation
for two periods, and then increases by one standard deviation for four periods, iii) the
borrowing limit relaxes by one standard deviation for two periods, and then abruptly
tightens by one standard deviation for four periods. The resulting shocks, which we
feed into the model can be seen in Figure (3.3.1).
For each shock, we then analyze the unconditional behavior of the model by assuming
that the other two remain at their steady-state levels. We relax this assumption in
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Section (3.3.4). Figure (3.4.1) plots the impulse responses following a shock, which
induces a drop in tradable output (solid black line), an increase in the real interest
rate (red line), and a tightening of the collateral constraint of households (dotted black
line). Overall, we see that despite the heterogeneous source of the crisis shock, the
e↵ects on the variables of the economy are similar.
The crisis induces a moderate deleveraging, whereby households cut down on their
private debt. Since the real interest rate remains unchanged (or is exogenously set
to increase), the economy is forced to improve its current account by reducing total
consumption or increasing the production of the nontradable good. Given that the
income e↵ect dominates, there is an increase in the desire to save from the part of the
households and a fall in a desire to consume. In addition, given that nominal wages
are downwardly rigid and cannot adjust to a lower level on impact, the only way such
a deflation could come about would be through a nominal exchange rate depreciation.
However, this is prevented since the economy is operating under a fixed exchange
rate. As a result, the improvement in the current account can only come about by a
reduction in the consumption of the nontradable good. The drop in the consumption
of the nontradable good in turn should generate a real exchange rate depreciation but
since the nominal exchange rate is fixed, under a terms of trade shock this translates to
a fall in the price of nontradables. Given the fixed nominal wages, employing further
labor into the nontradable sector thus becomes less profitable and firms are pushed
to reduce their labor demand and lower their production of the nontradable good.
Although labor demand declines, at the same time the supply schedule does not shift.
This is because the combination of a currency peg and downward rigidity of nominal
wages prevents the real wage from adjusting downward. At this point, firms are on their
labor demand schedule, but households are o↵ their labor supply schedule generating
unemployment. The fall in labor demand translates to an increase in unemployment
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in disequilibrium and the fall in the production of the nontradable goods leads to a
recession in the economy.
As we have seen, crisis shocks lead to the two distortions to move hand in hand, thereby
generating the stylized fact presented in Figure (3.1.1). Unemployment increases and
household debt-to-GDP ratios do not fall as sharply, given the negative growth rate of
output.
3.3.3 Introducing Active Fiscal Policy
In what follows, we augment the model to study the e↵ects of active fiscal policy in
mitigating, or o↵setting the two distortions generated by the crisis shocks. We view
this application as an exercise in financial crisis management. In order to allow fiscal
policy to have a meaningful role in the environment, we introduce a government that
can issue debt to households and raise distortionary taxes to finance its expenditures
in consumption and productive investment. Furthermore, we stipulate that the fiscal
instruments respond to changes in deviations of the government debt-to-GDP ratio
from a stochastic target in the spirit of Erceg and Linde (2013). In order to connect
the fiscal block with the labor market we also assume that a share of the nontradable
good is used by the government for both consumption and investment. In this way,
fiscal shocks will be able to propagate themselves through the nontradable production
sector to a↵ect labor supply and demand decisions. The changes we make to the model
can be summarized as follows:
1. Introduction of government debt. Households can now purchase one-period non-
contingent bonds dgt from the government paying an interest rate R
g
t .
2. The government can raise revenues from distortionary taxes on households’ pri-
vate debt (a capital control) and through lump-sum taxes.
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3. The government uses the revenues from taxation and the issuance of debt to
finance (wasteful) consumption and productive investment. The latter comple-
ments labor supply as an input of production in the nontradable sector.
4. The nontradable good is in part consumed by the government, and used for
investment purposes.
5. Fiscal policy instruments are exogenously given and have a rule-based stabilizing
role.
With these additions to the model, the equations that change are the following:
cTt + ptc
N
t + dt
 
1  ⌧ dt
 
+ dgt = d
g
t 1R
g
t 1 + dt 1Rt 1 + y
T
t + wtNt + ⇧
N
t   Tt (3.3.1)
 t
 
1  ⌧ dt
 
=  
⇣
Rft
⌘
Et t+1 + µt + ⌘t (3.3.2)
pt (Gt + it) = d
g
t + d
g
t 1R
g
t 1 + ⌧
d
t dt + Tt (3.3.3)
Y Nt = F (Nt) =  N
⇠
t
 
Kgt+1
  
(3.3.4)
Kt+1 = (1   g)Kt + it (3.3.5)
F (Nt) = y
N
t = c
N
t +Gt + it (3.3.6)
wt =  ⇠ptN
⇠ 1
t
 
Kgt+1
 
(3.3.7)
Equation (3.3.1) is the new household budget constraint whereby households now also
have the ability to purchase/sell one-period non-contingent bonds from to the govern-
ment (dgt ) at an interest rate R
g
t . Private debt (dt) is now taxed by the government at
rate ⌧ dt , alluding to a capital control tax. We do not allow for labor income taxation
as labor is inelastically supplied. Households are also subject to a non-distortionary
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lump-sum tax Tt (transfer if Tt > 0). Equation (3.3.2) is thus the redefined Euler
equation of households for private debt, which is now taxed at rate ⌧ dt .
Equation (3.3.3) specifies the government budget constraint, whereby government ex-
penditures consist of consumption (Gt) and investment (it) of the nontradable good
(yNt ). The nontradable good is now produced jointly with household labor (Nt) by
investing in public capital Kt. We assume that labor and public capital are aggregated
using the technology in (3.3.4). The law of motion for public capital is given by equa-
tion (3.3.5). (3.3.6) thus defines the new market clearing condition for the nontradable
sector. Nontradable firms produce Y Nt by choosing Nt but the introduction of public
capital, will now also a↵ect the price for labor demanded (equation (3.3.7)).
In addition, due to the introduction of government debt to the model, two new equa-
tions arise:
 t =   (R
g
t )Et t+1 (3.3.8)
Tt =  
✓
dgt
GDPt
◆ 
(3.3.9)
Equation (3.3.8) is the households’ Euler equation for government assets, whilst equa-
tion (3.3.9) is a tax rule targeting the government debt-to-GDP, ratio and required to
close the model.
Finally, following Erceg and Linde (2013), we assume that fiscal consolidations and
expansions are undertaken through changes of the fiscal instruments  2  G, i, ⌧ d in
the following way
 t = ⇢ 0 t 1 + (1  ⇢ 0)
✓
dgt
GDPt
  d
g
t
GDPt
⇤◆
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where d
g
t
GDPt
⇤
is an exogenous stochastic target for the government debt-to-GDP ratio,
and which follows an AR(1) process given by
dgt
GDPt
⇤
= ⇢dg
dgt 1
GDPt 1
⇤
+ "dgt (3.3.10)
where ⇢ 0   0 and ⇢dg < 1. For the instruments Gt and igt , positive (negative) shocks
to the government debt-to-GDP target will generate a fiscal consolidation (expansion).
The rest of the model equations remain as they are.
3.3.4 Financial Crisis Management
We are primarily interested in investigating how the two distortions implied by the crisis
react in response to fiscal shocks. For this reason, we are prevented from analyzing
the e↵ects of fiscal shocks in the steady state. Instead, we resort to calculating the
marginal e↵ects of fiscal policy by dictating a transition from a boom-type regime
to a bust-type regime throughout the whole impulse response horizon. We do so in
the following way. First, we specify a joint path for the three crisis shocks that lead
total output to expand by one standard deviation for two periods and subsequently
contract for four periods. In the remaining horizon, we allow these shocks to decay
at the rate specified by their autoregressive coe cients. We then record the responses
of the variables in this horizon. By observing the responses of unemployment and the
Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint we can guarantee that the combined
shocks led to a transition in regimes. Second, we record the same set of responses
adding to the crisis shocks an additional one-time fiscal shock (governed by equation
(3.3.10)) in the period in which the growth rate of output turns negative. Third, we
compute the di↵erence between the second and the first step to obtain the e↵ects of the
marginal response of the fiscal shock. Given that we choose to insert the fiscal shock
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on the period of transition from a regime with binding collateral constraints and no
unemployment to a regime with slack collateral constraint and positive unemployment,
we can adequately study the e↵ects of fiscal policy in influencing the distortions.
The parameters for the augmented model can be seen in Table (3.2). As can be seen
we assume a common parameterisation for the exogenous determination of the fiscal
instruments.
Table 3.2: Parameter Values for Model with Fiscal Policy
Parameter Label Value
  Risk aversion 2
⇣ Intratemportal elasticity of substitution between T and NT 0.45
⌘ Share of tradables 0.3
  Discount factor 0.945
⇠ Labor share in NT sector 0.75
  Degree of wage rigidity 0.997
n¯ Labor endowment 1
  Tax rule (multiplicative term) 0.5
  Tax rule (exponent) 0.6
 Public capital share 0.25
 g Depreciation rate of public capital 0.025
⇢dg Autocorrelation coe cient for debt-to-GDP target 0.7
⇢ 0 Share of fiscal instrument response 0.8
Impulse Response Functions
A fiscal consolidation in this setting is interpreted as a decrease in government consump-
tion, following the deviation of the government debt-to-GDP ratio from the stochastic
target. The impulse response functions following a triggered fiscal consolidation can
be seen in Figures (3.4.2). A decrease in government expenditures acts as a negative
demand shock and can be interpreted as the negative terms of trade shock mentioned
before. The key di↵erence however is the stronger decline in private debt, which arises
due to the fact that consumption is crowded out on impact. Although a negative gov-
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ernment spending shock incentivizes savings (correcting for the first distortion and the
slow deleveraging process observed in the crisis), this comes at a cost of high unem-
ployment. On the other hand, following a positive government spending shock (Figure
3.4.3) we see that unemployment is reduced, at the cost of an increase in private debt.
In conclusion, a government spending policy alone (regardless of the direction) cannot
a↵ect the combination of distortions that arise due to the crisis. Figure (3.4.4) plots
impulse response functions following a positive government investment shock. Again,
we observe that the debt-unemployment trade-o↵ is present. The di↵erence with the
government spending shock is that now an increase in government investment raises
unemployment, rather than decrease it. The reason is due to the fact that investment
requires resources from the nontradable production sector, and given the assumed
technology for production it displaces private labor. Finally, Figure (3.4.5) plots the
impulse responses from a shock that increases the capital control tax (negative shock).
This clearly incentivizes a deleveraging, but at the cost of an increase in unemployment.
Qualitative Results
The impulse responses presented above only illustrate the marginal e↵ect of the fiscal
shocks in the environment (recall that crisis shocks are active throughout the horizon).
In turn, Figures (3.4.6), (3.4.7), and (3.4.8) present a comparison between a baseline
case with only crisis shocks active (black lines) and a case where both the crisis shocks
and the fiscal policy shocks are active. This is purely done for illustrative reasons, and
as such we increase the size of the fiscal shocks to 10% of GDP in order to gain a visual
understanding of the e↵ects. The main message, which comes across is that there does
not exist a specific fiscal shock, which can undo both distortions at the same time.
That is, reduce debt and unemployment simultaneously.
136
3.3. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Welfare Multipliers
Since no fiscal instrument can o↵set both distortions simultaneously we attempt to
gauge the e↵ects of fiscal policy in this setting by reporting welfare multipliers. Follow-
ing Sims and Wol↵ (2013) we define the welfare multiplier as the ratio of the response
of welfare, to the response of the fiscal shock on impact. Welfare is given by the value
function of the household (Vt) specified in a recursive form
Vt = U (Ct) +  EtVt+1
In order to render the units of welfare into an interpretable measure we scale the ratio
of the response of welfare to the response of the fiscal shock by dividing by the steady
state marginal utility of consumption
 
U
0  
C¯t
  
. In this way, the welfare multiplier
corresponds to the one period consumption equivalent change in welfare for a one unit
change in the fiscal instrument under consideration.
MW =
@Vt
@ t
 
1
U 0
 
C¯t
 !
We report welfare multipliers in Table (3.3). These can be interpreted as the units of
steady state consumption in the period of the shock that would cause an equivalent
change in welfare to the fiscal shock. For example, the change in welfare from a decrease
in government spending is equivalent to an increase in consumption of 0.14. As can
be seen, the negative government investment shock produces the largest welfare gains,
measurable in these terms.
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Table 3.3: Welfare Multipliers
Instrument Direction of shock Welfare multiplier
Government spending
Positive shock 4.51
Negative shock 0.14
Government investment
Positive shock 4.70
Negative shock 5.61
Capital control tax
Positive shock -2.56
Negative shock -5.89
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the e↵ects of fiscal policy in a crisis environment where the
joint interaction of labor market and financial frictions give rise to unemployment and
an increasing private sector debt level. It has shown that following three types of crisis
shocks, the economy is pushed to tighten borrowing constraints for households and via
the real exchange rate this distortion is propagated to the labor market. Active financial
crisis management from the side of fiscal policy fails to correct both of these distortions
simultaneously leaving it toothless in the face of a debt-unemployment trade-o↵.
On the policy front, and given an agenda for tackling unemployment and promoting
debt deleveraging, the analysis suggests that there is no correct side to the debate on
austerity against stimulus of an economy. Certain specifications of fiscal consolidations
can incentivize debt deleveraging, but at the cost of accompanied unemployment. On
the other hand, certain types of fiscal expansions lead to opposite results. In terms of
welfare multipliers, the model predicts that a negative shock to government investment
produces the most beneficial e↵ects, despite the distortions it leaves uncorrected. Thus,
in a setting, which is reminiscent of the current environment in the Eurozone, there is
no one correct policy prescription to combat the e↵ects of financial crisis shocks.
Possible extensions to the investigation could be made on the following dimensions. The
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analysis so far has been implemented under unconditional fiscal shocks. That is, when
one instrument is active, the rest are assumed to be switched o↵. A mixed strategy
whereby more tha one instruments move in the same, or opposite direction could
potentially a↵ect both distortions in a corrective manner. Furthermore, it would be of
interest to incorporate an empirical component into the analysis, by studying the e↵ect
of regime-dependent fiscal shocks on unemployment, private debt, private consumption
and the real exchange rate using vector auto-regressions. Finally, although this has
deliberately been omitted from the scope of this paper, it would be important to
characterize the optimal policy (in terms of distortionary taxes) that can o↵set the
wedges that arise from the the pecuniary externality and the nominal rigidity.
139
Appendix
Figure 3.4.1: Dynamics of a Crisis
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Figure 3.4.2: IRFs following a Negative Government Spending Shock
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Figure 3.4.3: IRFs following a Positive Government Spending Shock
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Figure 3.4.4: IRFs following a Positive Government Investment Shock
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Figure 3.4.5: IRFs following a Negative Capital Control Tax Shock
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Figure 3.4.6: Simulations following a Negative Government Consumption Shock
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Figure 3.4.7: Simulations following a Positive Government Investment Shock
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Figure 3.4.8: Simulations following a Negative Capital Control Tax Shock
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